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PREFACE
Interconnectivity between systems is one of the 
structuring and determining features of our modern 
world, which is becoming ever more complex 
and dynamic. Many systems are growing larger. 
Socio-ecological systems are moving ever closer 
to biophysical boundaries, thresholds and tipping 
points. Socio-technical systems are being exposed 
to disruption of various causes. Dealing with risks 
associated with so-called complex adaptive systems is 
a concern for many organisations. Complex adaptive 
systems contain interacting feedback loops and are 
subject to external shocks and internal stresses that 
may destabilise or disrupt their functioning.
External shocks to interconnected systems, or 
unsustainable stresses, may cause uncontrolled 
feedback and cascading effects, extreme events, 
and unwanted side effects. Real-world examples 
of such unanticipated impacts are myriad, such as 
the disastrous economic and social consequences 
due to the collapse of the Aral Sea or large fisheries 
worldwide. Given these looming threats, organisations 
need to think about how they can avoid, mitigate or 
prevent the manifestation of systemic risks, which may 
affect their normal functioning. If such risks cannot be 
prevented, organisations must either adapt or transform 
to cope with them. Otherwise, they may have no other 
choice but to be exposed to unexpected destructive 
consequences, operate in crisis mode and integrate 
loss and damage, as in the case of unavoidable 
negative consequences of climate change (UNEP, 
2016).
This document proceeds from the working hypothesis 
that systemic risks are risks that evolve because of 
the inherently dynamic nature of complex adaptive 
systems. In particular, due to nonlinear interactions 
among system components, these risks often appear 
as ‘surprises’. Its purpose is thus to help organisations 
deal with systemic risks that develop in complex 
adaptive systems, which characterise the environment 
in which most organisations operate. 
IRGC intends neither to build a theory of systemic risks 
nor to focus on particular systemic risks, but rather 
seeks to provide practical guidelines that organisations 
can adapt to their particular needs and objectives. 
This is in contrast to other literature on systemic risks 
that focuses on understanding them. The scope of this 
IRGC project is on systemic risks in socio-technical and 
socio-ecological systems, i.e., these guidelines do not 
address purely financial risks. They are aimed at risk 
and policy analysts and other professionals in business 
and the public sector, who work to improve capabilities 
to identify, understand and manage risks in complex 
systems (OECD, 2017), which implies coping with 
instability and unpredictable or low-probability events. 
IRGC’s project on systemic risks governance stems 
from previous IRGC work on risk governance, emerging 
risks, slow-developing catastrophic risks and resilience: 
• The IRGC Risk Governance Framework describes 
the fundamental principles and concepts for 
governing risks marked by complexity, uncertainty 
and ambiguity. It is the cornerstone of IRGC's, 
following work and publications. In that sense, the 
guidelines described in this report focus on specific 
aspects of systemic risks, thus complementing and 
adding to the main framework (IRGC, 2005; 2017).
• IRGC's work on emerging risks, defined as new risks 
or known risks that develop in new context conditions 
and are unfamiliar to their managers, is presented in 
several publications (IRGC, 2010; 2011; 2015).
• In 2011, IRGC convened a group of scientists 
and policymakers to discuss the topic of slow-
developing catastrophic risks (SDCRs) that may 
ultimately lead to critical transitions or regime shifts. 
The workshop led to a concept note (IRGC, 2013), 
which broadly described the characteristics of SDCRs 
as well as some mathematical features of early-
warning signals associated with regime shifts. The 
concept note prompted further interest in how to deal 
with SDCRs, and IRGC convened a second workshop 
on SDCR governance in 2013. 
• Resilience in IRGC concepts is a strategy to deal 
with risks that have potentially large and unexpected 
negative outcomes and disruptions. IRGC invited 
selected authors to contribute to a resource guide on 
resilience, published in 2016, that provides insight to 
academics and practitioners alike (IRGC, 2016).
In March 2017, IRGC invited a group of experts to 
jointly discuss these concepts in the context of risks in 
complex adaptive systems and work towards producing 
guidelines that could help organisations deal with 
systemic risks. In October 2017, a second workshop 
discussed an earlier draft of the guidelines described in 
this document. The guidelines are thus the result of a 
collaborative process in which more than 40 experts in 
academia, policy and industry have participated.
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Systemic risks are fundamentally different from 
conventional risks. Traditional risk management 
practices are not sufficient for dealing with them. This 
document addresses the question of how to deal with 
systemic risks in the context of system transitions, i.e., 
in situations that require adaptation to new context 
conditions or transformation of an organisation or 
ecosystem. 
The guidelines have the following objectives:
• Provide guidance to organisations in their initiatives 
to understanding complex system dynamics and 
reflecting upon their position within these dynamics.
• Help actors in a system to (a) prevent the shift of the 
system within which the organisation operates to an 
undesirable regime, or (b) trigger and facilitate the 
transition of the respective system to a preferable 
regime, considering changes in underlying context 
conditions or proximity to a tipping point that may 
trigger a regime shift.
The guidelines comprise seven interlinked steps:
Step 1 Explore the system in which the organisation 
operates; define the boundaries of the system 
and the organisation’s position in a dynamic 
environment. 
Step 2 Develop scenarios, considering ongoing and 
potential future transitions.
Step 3 Determine goals and the level of tolerability for 
risk and uncertainty.
Step 4 Co-develop management strategies to deal 
with each scenario and the systemic risks that 
affect or may affect the organisation, and to 
navigate the transition.
Step 5 Address unanticipated barriers and sudden 
critical shifts that may come up during the 
process.
Step 6 Decide, test and implement strategies.
Step 7 Monitor, learn from, review and adapt. 
SUMMARY
There must be iteration between the phases, 
orchestrated by a process manager or ‘navigator.’ 
While these guidelines neither dictate what should be 
decided nor prescribe a normative ‘best’ objective, 
they do provide options that organisations can 
consider.
At all stages, communication, openness and 
transparency are key to ensuring smooth 
proceedings and collaboration; learning together 
and experimentation are essential for improving an 
organisation’s capacity to deal with systemic risks. 
This can be organised by the process manager or 
‘navigator,’ who has the additional tasks of organising 
some form of ownership for systemic risks within the 
organisation, and helping the organisation ‘navigate’ 
through transitions that mark changes in complex 
systems.
In the face of many unknowns, increasing the 
overall resilience of an organisation can be a way 
to prepare for and better deal with the shocks and 
stresses arising from systemic risks. In line with 
mainstream recommendations for resilience-building, 
IRGC proposes three main strategic approaches 
for operationalising the concept of systemic risks 
management:
• Support and strengthen the ability of a system to 
self-organise and self-control
• Undertake pro-active interventions based 
on prevention, mitigation, adaptation and 
transformation principles
• Prepare for disruptions, accidents and crises.
These strategic approaches can be combined or 
implemented successively if proximity to a regime shift 
seems to increase.
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Economies, societies and ecosystems are dynamic, 
constantly evolving complex systems that contain a 
great number of interacting feedback loops. Some 
of these loops promote stability; others cause 
instability, leading to cascading events and potential 
runaway collapse. Planners usually try to ensure that 
the stabilising loops prevail, because they are more 
familiar and comfortable with routine strategies that 
aim to maintain existing situations. However, this 
may be a short-sighted approach, because there 
is always the possibility of a new situation arising 
where destabilising loops abruptly take over to 
produce percolation effects. The analysis presented 
in an IRGC report on ‘slow-developing catastrophic 
risks’ suggests that while such collapses are often 
foreseeable, they are largely inevitable because they 
are built into the nature of complex adaptive systems 
(IRGC, 2013; Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver & 
Windawi, 2015). This aspect of complex adaptive 
systems and the risks that develop in those systems 
are key features that support IRGC’s suggestions in 
these guidelines. 
Interconnectivity within and between complex adaptive 
systems is one of the defining and determining 
features of our modern world. While interconnectivity 
can increase system efficiency and service delivery, it 
can reduce resilience to shocks if it does not include 
buffer capacity and if the connections between the 
nodes are too tight. Interconnectivity may expose 
the various layered (sub-)systems to risks of sudden 
external shocks and unsustainable stresses within 
the system (e.g., slow-moving and imperceptible 
changes that can ultimately drive the system beyond 
a tipping point), resulting in cascading changes in the 
system itself and other interconnected systems. From 
a broader economic welfare perspective, thinking in 
terms of resilience in contrast to efficiency implies 
fostering policies that reduce the duration and depth 
of shocks, enhance the capacity to recover quickly 
and reduce the severity of the impact on welfare 
(Connelly et al., 2017). 
Complex adaptive systems are in constant flux, 
and transitions between regimes are natural 
processes. Traditional probabilistic risk-assessment 
methodologies, which are based on linear or well-
established cause-and-effect-relationships, cannot 
be successfully applied to risks that arise in such 
1. INTRODUCTION
systems and may even have counter-intuitive and 
unintended consequences. A better understanding 
of systemic risks and an appropriate approach for 
developing management options are thus essential 
for decision-makers to prepare their organisation for 
future challenges. Since a system can be hampered by 
factors that reside inside or outside of its functioning 
as a complex system, dealing with systemic risks 
requires a dual process of identifying both problems 
and their interactions. The OECD recommends that 
governments should seek to address global shocks 
and cascading failures, strengthen resilience and 
create capacity for improved agility in case something 
happens (OECD, 2011; 2014a; 2014b; Linkov et al., 
2014). 
1.1 Characterisation of systemic risks
Systemic risks are the “threat that individual failures, 
accidents, or disruptions present to a system through 
the process of contagion” (Centeno et al., 2015). The 
notion of systemic risk “refers to the risk or probability 
of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to 
the breakdown of individual parts or components” 
(Kaufman & Scott, 2003). While such events can also 
be triggered by a failure in one subcomponent, i.e., 
an individual breakdown, they are characterised by 
further cascading effects that affect the larger system. 
In the context of interconnected financial systems, 
for instance, Hendricks (2009) suggests that “a 
systemic risk is the risk of a phase transition from one 
equilibrium to another, much less optimal equilibrium, 
characterised by multiple self-reinforcing feedback 
mechanisms making it difficult to reverse.”
Systems prone to systemic risks are highly 
interconnected and intertwined with one another. 
Such interconnection contributes to complex causal 
structures and dynamic evolutions, non-linear in their 
cause-effect relationships, often stochastic in their 
effect structure, and potentially global in their reach (in 
the sense that they are not confined within borders) 
(Renn, 2016, 2017b). Systemic risks overwhelmingly 
do not follow normal risk distributions but tend to be 
fat-tailed, and there is a high likelihood of catastrophic 
events once the risk materialises. They can trigger 
unexpected large-scale changes to a system or imply 
uncontrollable large-scale threats to it (Helbing, 2010) 
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Box 1: Complex adaptive systems
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are systems of distributed interacting components, whose conditions can change in 
response to their environments and each other (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Complex adaptive system in a changing external environment 
A common element of a CAS is that an understanding of the individual parts of a system, taken individually, does not 
offer a robust explanation of how the larger system functions or changes over time. Instead, a CAS includes a dynamic 
network of interactions, where feedback loops between systems and nested relationships between a larger system and 
a component sub-system can trigger system-wide disruptions or changes. Under some conditions, small interactions or 
disruptions to minute sub-systems can generate substantial systemic changes across a much larger web of interconnected 
infrastructures, or social and economic systems. The adaptive and multi-actor nature of a CAS makes it inherently difficult 
to model or analyse via simple linear cause and effect models (Cohen & Axelrod, 2000).
CAS typically show the following features (Nursimulu, 2015a; Helbing, 2010):
1. Self-organisation and emergence – The aggregation of the individual behaviours of system drivers or components 
produces an organised pattern at the macro level, where resulting macro behaviours cannot be ascribed to the added 
effects of individual components.
2. Feedbacks – Negative feedbacks have a dampening effect and maintain a system within a particular regime, whereas 
positive feedbacks amplify changes occurring in subsystems.
3. Diversity and regime shifts – CAS often have alternative stable states and can flip from one regime to another. Regime 
shifts can happen naturally owing to the internal dynamics of the system, but may also be triggered by external events 
that disrupt normal feedback mechanisms (Figure 2).
4. Regime-shift cascades – These can happen as a result of common drivers affecting different systems, whether directly 
or indirectly by affecting drivers in other systems.
5. Anthropogenic influence – Although regime shifts occur naturally in CAS without the influence of external agents, 
human actors and activities influence the state of the system, especially when they are primary components, and trigger 
regime shifts.
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feedback
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simple self-organised
local relationships
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Complex adaptative
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Figure 2: Ball-in-cup diagram to illustrate regime shifts (original design in Scheffer, M., 2009a. Critical Transitions in 
Nature and Society. New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
 
The leftmost plot shows two possible stable states, the white ball in regime one and the black ball in regime two. The 
middle plot indicates a regime shift due to an external shock. The rightmost plot indicates a regime shift due to a change in 
underlying variables / components.
and may cause ripple effects beyond the domain in 
which the risk originally appears (Renn, 2016, 2017b). 
Complex systemic risks are thus fundamentally 
different from conventional risks (see Box 2), and new 
tools and practices are needed to address them.
Systemic risks tend to be underestimated and do not 
attract the same level of attention as catastrophic 
events. One of the reasons for this is that complex 
structures defy human intuition, which assumes that 
causality is linked to proximity in time and space 
(for example, relatively small and even imperceptible 
system shocks can trigger substantial system change 
over an extended period). Another reason is that 
systemic risks are under a distributed responsibility: 
everyone is responsible for a part of the system 
but no one has the legitimacy to act on the entire 
system. However, complexity implies that far-fetched 
and distant changes can have major impacts on the 
system under scrutiny. Furthermore, humans tend to 
learn by trial and error, and facing non-linear systems 
with tipping points encourages us to repeat our 
errors because feedback remains positive for a long 
time until the tipping point is reached. But when the 
tipping point is passed, the error (which can induce a 
collapse) is so dramatic that learning from the crisis is 
either impossible or too costly (Renn, 2016, 2017b). 
Finally, systemic risks also touch upon the common 
pool problem. Within such a common pool problem, 
each actor wins individually in the short run if he or 
she takes the free rider position and lets others invest 
in risk reduction. There is no incentive to change one’s 
behaviour. However, if we want systems that exhibit 
better properties to deal with risks, the incentives must 
be designed in such a way that they do not require 
changing human nature (Luyendijk, 2015).
The consequences of failing to appreciate and 
manage the characteristics of complex global systems 
and problems can be immense (Helbing, 2012). 
Well-known examples are the 2008 global financial 
crisis, the collapse and desertification of the Aral Sea, 
or the 2011 Japanese earthquake and Fukushima 
nuclear accident. For lesser-known examples, in 
Southeast Asia, the destruction of mangrove forests 
for commercial shrimp farming is known to have 
caused water pollution and increased the vulnerability 
of coastal areas to cyclones and tsunamis. The 
result of this was seen in 2004 when these areas 
were devastated by the South Asian Tsunami, with 
significant loss of life and property. Areas where 
mangroves were not destroyed were less affected by 
such losses. This led to calculations about the actual 
contribution of commercial farming to the economy, 
in comparison to the loss of natural protection against 
tsunamis and cyclones and other damages. The 
cost-benefit analysis suggests that the cost of loss 
of biodiversity (negative social value) was larger than 
the economic benefits from shrimp farming (positive 
private value) (Giri et al., 2008).
Shock
Regime 1 Regime 2Regime 1 Regime 2
Change in underlying variables
Regime 2
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Box 2: Comparison of conventional and systemic risks
Type of risk Definition Main features Examples Implications
Conventional 
risks
Known and well-
defined risks
• Familiarity – recognisable 
patterns and management 
regimes that are relatively 
stable and have proven to 
be effective if implemented 
according to certain rules
• Bicycle theft
• Salmonella infection
• Car accidents
• Obesity
Use standard risk 
management practices, 
e.g., regulation
Emerging 
risks*
New risks or known 
risks that become 
apparent in new 
context conditions 
(IRGC 2015)
• Uncertainty regarding 
causes, potential 
consequences, and 
probabilities of occurrence
• Lack of familiarity with the 
risk
• New processes and 
products in the field of 
synthetic biology
• Malaria spreading to 
higher latitudes
Focus on early 
detection and analysis 
of elements that trigger 
emerging risks.
Prepare to revise 
decisions and adapt
Systemic 
risks
Threats that 
individual failures, 
accidents or 
disruptions present 
to a system through 
the process of 
contagion
• Highly interconnected 
risks with complex causal 
structures, non-linear 
cause-effect relationships
• Lack of knowledge 
about interconnections 
in an interdependent and 
complex environment, 
prevention
• Desertification and 
collapse of the Aral Sea
• 2008 global financial 
crisis 
• Pandemics
• Cyber-security 
• Global climate change
• Fish stocks depletion
Focus on adaptation 
and transformation of 
the organisation and 
the system
* Some emerging risks may manifest themselves in complex systems and thus require a systemic approach to their 
assessment and management. Some systemic risks may be first seen as emerging. 
1.2 Examples of systemic risks
This section details a small number of notable examples 
in various sectors, including economics (the 2008 
financial crisis), ecology (the collapse of the Aral Sea 
as well as steady depreciation of global fish stocks), 
society (the rise of a rideshare/personal transportation 
economy), and global megatrends (planetary 
boundaries). These examples show that systemic risks 
can have multiple causes and impacts, are difficult to 
delineate and are perceived differently by stakeholders. 
They can be resistant to policy response.
The 2008 financial crisis 
In 2008, the United States experienced a major financial 
crisis that led to the most serious global economic 
recession since World War II. The crisis triggered a 
global economic meltdown in a ‘financial contagion 
effect.’ This international contagion effect was driven 
by the highly interconnected nature of the global 
financial system, which had all the characteristics of 
a complex dynamic system, including the potential 
for tipping points and system-wide cascading failures 
(Haldane & May, 2011). A collapsing, debt-fuelled 
bubble in residential real estate led to a rapid spread 
of credit problems across institutions and markets, 
which ultimately brought down major institutions and 
threatened the viability of global markets.
The complexity of the system, the perverse effect of 
certain regulations and practices, and the resulting 
cascading failures have been analysed thoroughly. 
They are famously illustrated by a reply from the British 
Academy in response to a question by the Queen of 
England as to why nobody had foreseen the financial 
crisis: ‘‘Everyone seemed to be doing their job properly 
on its merit. And according to standard measures of 
success, they were often doing it well. The failure was 
to see how collectively this added up to a series of 
interconnected imbalances. Individual risks may rightly 
have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system 
as a whole was vast’’ (Helbing, 2013; Centeno et al., 
2015; Maila, 2010; Marshall, Goodman, Zowghi & da 
Rimini, 2015).
Takeaway
In interconnected systems such as the global 
financial systems, the risk of contagion is 
high. One needs to better align or coordinate 
regulations, incentives, responsibilities and 
practices. 
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The collapse of the Aral Sea 
Located in Central Asia, the Aral Sea used to be one 
of the four largest lakes in the world. The Aral Sea 
had been steadily shrinking since the 1960s after 
the two main rivers that fed into it were diverted by 
irrigation projects for water-intensive cotton and 
wheat fields. By 2007, it had declined to 10% of its 
original size, and by 2014, the eastern basin of the Aral 
Sea had completely dried up. Former UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon called this development 
"one of the planet's worst environmental disasters" 
(UN, 2010). The main cause for why the once-large 
Aral Sea has slowly dried up is years of overuse in 
irrigation and land-reclamation projects, driven by 
political and economic ambitions. The reduction of 
the Sea triggered various ecological, economic, and 
sociological outcomes that affected environmental and 
economic sustainability. 
Besides immediate ecological and socioeconomic 
shifts, further cascading consequences arose. As one 
example, the shrinking lake left behind a salt desert 
contaminated by toxic waste, pesticide residues and 
agricultural run-offs, resulting in poison dust storms 
and contaminated water that negatively impacts public 
health across the region (Nursimulu, 2015a).
Takeaway
Even after the cause of the risk was eliminated, 
the Aral Sea ecosystem was not able to go back 
to its original state because a threshold had 
been crossed and the shift was irreversible.
Fish stocks depletion / overfishing
Billions of people around the globe depend upon 
robust quantities of seafood for their diet. However, 
overfishing has contributed to situations where stocks 
of various fish and shellfish are at or below levels 
of replenishment. As much as 85% of the world’s 
fisheries are thought to be overexploited, including 
complete depletion, near-depletion, or recovery from 
near-depletion (Worm et al., 2009). 
Past examples include the collapse and closure of 
California Sardine fisheries in the early 1960s, the 
collapse of the Atlanto-Scandian Herring fisheries 
(Iceland, Norway, Russia) in the late 1960’s, and the 
collapse and closure of the Northern cod fisheries 
(Newfoundland, Canada) in 1992 (Hauge, Cleeland & 
Wilson, 2009). Plausible future examples include the 
Bay of Bengal, where growing ‘dead zones’ signal an 
imminent collapse of fish populations without strong 
interventions to stem local overfishing (Ghosh & Lobo, 
2017).
The consequences of overfishing are beyond the 
substantial drop in the stock of any individual 
fish species. Fish and shellfish ecosystems are 
both interconnected and fragile – a disruption via 
the collapse of one species can easily trigger a 
collapse in others as well. Further, the depletion of 
local fish stocks could prove disastrous for coastal 
communities that depend upon seafood as a staple of 
their diets, and major negative economic and social 
consequences often follow the collapse of fisheries. 
As such, national and international management of 
complex fish ecosystems is necessary to prevent 
ecosystem collapses (Hauge et al., 2009). 
Takeaway
Currently, many fish stocks worldwide are 
nearing a tipping-point of depletion. There are 
obvious incentives for people to freeload and 
ignore the limits until it is too late. It is critically 
important to implement management strategies 
to avoid the crossing of tipping-points.
Figure 3: The Aral Sea in 1989 (left) and 2014 (right) 
(Source: NASA. Collage by Producercunningham)
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Development of new systemic risks  
in the personal transportation sector 
Four fundamental innovations are currently 
revolutionising the automotive sector, car driving, 
and personal transportation. While such innovations 
may produce substantial improvements in economic 
development and service delivery to millions of people, 
they also represent broader threats that will affect both 
traditional automotive and taxi-based services:
• Automated driving (towards full automation) 
modifies drivers’ behaviours, will probably reduce 
the number and severity of accidents and is 
expected to increase traffic fluidity and efficiency.
• The connectivity between cars and infrastructure 
further improves traffic fluidity and paves the way 
for fully autonomous private transport systems.
• Electric cars contribute to reducing air pollution and 
CO2 emissions.
• The traditional community and business of taxi 
drivers are challenged by the advent of new services 
offered by companies such as Uber, and the 
ubiquity of transport services as a commodity.
The revolutionary developments in the transportation 
sector create a combination of disruptions that will 
have cascading consequences, causing systemic 
risks that in the coming future may affect a range 
of actors including traditional car servicing, parking 
operators, or taxi drivers. Many taxi companies did not 
anticipate or adjust to the revolution in the personal 
transportation sector and have lost a substantial 
proportion of their business already. Initially, such 
taxi companies have tried to resist at first, but likely 
have no other solution than to adapt their business 
by adopting similar technologies for direct online 
connectivity with clients, or transform their business 
models for more flexibility, in a society where 
connectivity and adaptability are key advantages. 
We might then see that traditional taxi drivers will 
rebound, adapt and transform their business model, 
by adopting the same innovations.
Takeaway
The automotive and transportation sectors are 
marked by complex interactions with several 
other systems. Changes in these sectors can be 
caused by and can cause disruptions in other 
interconnected systems.
Planetary boundaries and global megatrends
The world has witnessed unprecedented demographic 
and economic growth during the last two centuries, 
accompanied by massive urbanisation, globalisation 
of markets, accelerating technological development, 
and fundamental socio-economic and cultural 
transformations. These large-scale, long-term and 
high impact changes — often referred to as ‘global 
megatrends’ (EEA, 2015b; EEA, 2015a) — have led to 
substantial economic and human development, but 
have also resulted in excessive burdens on the global 
ecosystem, resource demands and adverse pressures 
on local ecosystems. 
Researchers of global environmental change have 
identified nine critical processes that regulate the 
stability and resilience of the Earth system (Rockström 
et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015b). They argue that 
sustainable development can only be achieved within 
a safe operating space for humanity identified by 
the biophysical realities of critical natural thresholds. 
Transgressing these ‘planetary boundaries’ could 
lead to undesirable and irreversible changes in 
the environment, putting ecosystems and societal 
resilience at risk, and making the Earth a much 
less hospitable place (Steffen, Broadgate, Deutsch, 
Gaffney & Ludwig, 2015a). 
Despite the uncertainty, there is evidence that both 
planetary and regional boundaries for some areas 
have already been transgressed, and systemic risks 
to human societies have or will soon materialise. The 
projected increased frequency of extreme climate-
related events in Europe (EEA, 2017) and elsewhere 
(ECA Working Group, 2009) will have effects on human 
health, agricultural production, energy, transport and 
tourism.
Takeaway
The risk of sudden, non-linear and irreversible 
change in Earth system processes poses 
serious threats to humanity. Preserving 
resilience of socio-ecological systems at the 
regional and global scales will depend on 
transforming the societal systems driving 
environmental degradation.
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1.3  Governance of systemic risks: 
navigating transitions
Risk governance includes the totality of actors, rules, 
conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned 
with how relevant risk information is collected, 
analysed and communicated, and how management 
decisions are taken (IRGC, 2005).
Operationalising the concept of systemic risks into 
principles and instruments for their governance is 
particularly challenging, as our current political and 
economic systems are not constructed to address 
such complex problems. The gradual evolution of 
many systemic risks entails a necessary look further 
into the future than regular planning timeframes usually 
allows (although the manifestation of these risks may 
result in immediate and catastrophic failure once a 
tipping point is crossed). Systemic risks also require a 
broader framing of the issue. 
If prevention or avoidance is not possible or sufficient, 
a key question for policymakers is how to limit the 
build-up of systemic risks and contain the impacts of 
breakdowns or collapses, which may lead to crises 
when they do happen. This report suggests that, 
instead of planning or managing for stabilisation or 
persistence (Folke et al., 2010), organisations may 
be advised to collaborate differently and engage in 
steering or governing a transition to a new regime, 
which involves adaptation to new context conditions 
or transformation of the organisation or system (Geels, 
2016).
The EEA (2016) defines transitions as “long-term, 
multi-dimensional and fundamental processes of 
change” which are based on “profound changes 
in dominant practices, policies and thinking.” It is 
important to note that transitions that are designed 
to reduce known systemic risks can potentially also 
be the source of new systemic risks. For example, 
energy transitions will trigger the development of 
renewable and less carbon-intensive fuels, which can 
contribute to reduced climate change risk and energy 
sustainability (Nursimulu, 2015b). However, this may 
contribute to economic risks in traditional industries, 
which may cascade to economic risks in other 
interconnected sectors and societal risks.
The guidelines discussed in this report serve as a 
process by which top management and key decision-
makers can better understand the systemic threats 
relevant to their organisation, and take action against 
such threats. However, the approach by which this 
action is possible and undertaken will vary widely 
based upon the political, institutional, and cultural 
elements of a given organisation and its willingness 
to address systemic risks and trigger change. For 
example, a complex Western democracy will likely 
have to engage into broad deliberation to develop 
substantial political capital to craft new policy against 
systemic threats. In contrast, leaders in an autocratic 
regime, or a private sector organisation with clear 
hierarchies and a small number of veto holders, may 
not have to work as hard to take action. Regardless 
of the type of organisation, the key is a willingness to 
explore one’s exposure and vulnerability to systemic 
risk, and identify opportunities to take action should 
permission be acquired to do so. The guidelines below 
serve as a process to reach that conclusion.
After describing the guidelines (Section 2), this 
report provides additional insights, supporting 
evidence and further guidance from specific 
disciplines:
• Resilience (Section 3)
• Complexity theory, systems thinking and 
network science (Section 4)
• Foresight and early-warning systems 
(Section 5).
Illustrative approaches are presented in 
Sections 6, 7 and 8.
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Box 3: Terminology – transition, adaptation, transformation and resilience
In these guidelines, some terms are used that may be defined differently across various application sectors and disciplines. 
This box provides clarity regarding how each key term will be used throughout each step of the guidelines – pulling insight 
from seminal scholarly works and the Oxford Dictionary.
Persistence involves absorbing on-going change or risk. It may also correspond to a non-vital degradation of the system 
as it absorbs such risk. Persistence can be thought of regarding the capacity of a system to exhibit low vulnerability to risk 
or provide a good level of resistance to risk. For example, persistent ecosystems can provide a steady supply of valued 
ecosystem services, but over the long term, this may require adaptation and possibly transformation at other scales.
Transition is the process or period of changing from one state or condition to another (Oxford Dictionary, n.d.). It is seen 
as a fluid change towards a new future, which is an improved version of what exists; it is a “gradual, continuous process of 
societal change, changing the character of society (or a complex part) structurally” (Rotmans, van Asselt, Geels, Verbong 
& Molendijk, 2000). A dynamic phase between two stable phases enables the system to shift from a first context to a new, 
stronger one. Crises are often needed to make such changes happen. In a condensed form, the EEA defines transitions as 
“long-term, multi-dimensional and fundamental processes of change, based on profound changes in dominant practices, 
policies, and thinking” (EEA, 2016).
Adaptation is the action or process of adapting or being adapted to something. It involves adjusting responses to 
changing external drivers and internal processes to remain in a necessary or a desired regime and on the current pathway. 
Adaptation is achieved through incremental change. It is seen as a slow process, which modifies the landscape only 
slightly.
Transformation is a thorough or dramatic change in form or appearance. It involves fundamentally changing the system 
dynamics, so there are new feedbacks to maintain the system in a new regime or along a new pathway (Renn, 2017a). It is 
a change towards a future that is fundamentally different from the existing paradigm (Roggema, 2012). In the case of the 
resilience of the global social-ecological system, transformability for sustainability is about shifting into new pathways of 
development (Folke, Biggs, Norström, Reyers & Rockström, 2016).
Resilience includes sustaining what we want to keep the same (i.e., persist). Adaptability can also be part of resilience 
because it represents the capacity to learn and adjust responses to changing drivers. The capacity to transform into 
something new and better may be beyond what conventional strategies for resilience can do. “The very dynamics between 
periods of abrupt and gradual change and the capacity to adapt and transform for persistence are at the core of the 
resilience of social-ecological systems” (Folke et al., 2010).
Ultimately, an organisation or system can engage in the process of change (transition) to adapt to change and, if needed, 
transform itself.
(Oxford Dictionary, n.d.; Rotmans, van Asselt, Geels, Verbong & Molendijk, 2000; Roggema, 2012; Folke et al., 2010)
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2. GUIDELINES FOR DEALING 
WITH SYSTEMIC RISKS
2.1 Objectives 
The guidelines proposed in this document are intended as a set of elements that 
policymakers and senior managers in public- and private-sector organisations are advised 
to consider when they work to address systemic risks. Because systemic risks evolve 
when systems are unstable, in transition to new regimes, the guidelines have the following 
objectives.
1. Guide organisations in understanding complex system dynamics and reflecting on 
their positions within them.
2. Help the actors in a system:
• prevent the shift of the system to an undesirable regime as a result of internal 
stresses or external shocks.
• trigger and facilitate the transition of the system to a preferable regime where the 
system and the elements that compose it are less susceptible to internal stresses or 
external shocks, considering changes in underlying context conditions or proximity 
to a tipping point that may trigger a regime shift.
For example, a desertification process in a region may be first observed by more frequent 
and longer periods of drought, but agricultural practices can adapt to new climate 
regimes to a certain extent. In the transportation industry, the advent of automated, 
connected and electric vehicles may trigger a regime shift and systemic change to a new 
type of transportation system. The transition will force actors in the system to adapt and 
transform. A change considered positive for certain actors can be disastrous for others. 
Transitions create winners and losers, and it is important to support losers in their efforts 
to recover from the transition, and adapt or transform. 
The guidelines build on previous IRGC work and follow the overarching principles 
outlined in the IRGC risk governance framework (IRGC, 2005). However, they are more 
specific about those aspects of risks in CAS that cannot be dealt with using conventional 
mitigation. The proposed process is also aligned with IRGC’s guidelines for the 
governance of emerging risks, which feature systemic risks as one type of emerging risks 
(IRGC, 2015). However, the present document focuses more on the systemic dimension 
and the extra knowledge it requires than upon the forward-looking (explorative) dimension 
that is covered in the guidelines for the governance of emerging risks. The suggested 
process is similar to traditional resilience assessment approaches but may differ in its aim: 
building capacity to adapt and transform, rather than bounce back after recovery (Quinlan, 
Berbés-Blázquez, Haider & Peterson, 2015).
Before being applied, the guidelines must be adapted to specific cases and contexts. 
Their successful implementation depends on strong leadership and the willingness to 
adapt or revise processes, focus on mid- and long-term issues, and accept and resolve 
trade-offs.
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1 A navigator is an individual responsible for guiding a vehicle to its destination. On a ship or aircraft it is the person 
on board responsible for its navigation. It is not the captain. The navigator's primary responsibility is to be aware 
of ship or aircraft position at all times. Responsibilities include planning the journey, advising the ship's captain 
or aircraft commander of estimated timing to destinations while en route, and ensuring hazards are avoided. The 
navigator is in charge of maintaining the aircraft's or ship's nautical charts, nautical publications, and navigational 
equipment, and generally has responsibility for meteorological equipment and communications. (Source: 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navigator)
2.2  Process for the governance of systemic risks 
IRGC’s guidelines for the governance of systemic risks comprise seven interlinked steps 
(see Figure 4). 
1. Explore the system, define its boundaries and dynamics
2. Develop scenarios considering possible ongoing and future transitions
3. Determine goals and the level of tolerability for risk and uncertainty
4. Co-develop management strategies dealing with each scenario
5. Address unanticipated barriers and sudden critical shifts
6. Decide, test and implement strategies
7. Monitor, learn from, review and adapt
Iteration between and within each step. The seven steps are listed here in the most 
likely sequence, but they can be ordered in different sequences depending on the 
application, existing knowledge and context. The whole sequence should be seen 
as a reflective exercise that includes all steps in a variety of orders and a system of 
iterations and feedback loops. The extent of iteration within each step depends on the 
circumstances and whether the various stakeholders agree on priorities and decisions to 
be taken. 
The process is coordinated by a process manager or ‘navigator’ 1, who plays 
a crucial role in connecting the various stakeholders, ensuring the effective 
implementation of the process, and helping an organisation navigate through 
transitions. The process manager organises the iteration between steps and decides to 
adapt the process to organisational specificities, as unexpected events will most certainly 
come up. For example, the guidelines suggest that organisations should “explore their 
system” before setting their goals. In some cases, the organisation can set its own goals 
at the beginning of the process. However, it must be prepared to revise its goals. The 
navigator constantly monitors the changing conditions of his complex and uncertain 
environment. He navigates complexity and uncertainty.
The process includes a step to “address unanticipated barriers and sudden critical 
shifts”, which is placed after the decision yet before the implementation of management 
strategies. The recommendation is that major known obstacles should be considered 
before deciding on a strategy, but also that attention should be given to preparing for 
unexpected barriers and lock-ins that will inevitably come up because of the dynamic 
nature of complex adaptive systems. When systems are in transition, strategies for the 
management of systemic risks will have to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Processes for the governance of systemic risks must be open to various entry 
points, depending on where the organisation is, considering the timing and path of 
development of a given risk / threat. If the risk is in a phase of slow development, the 
organisation has time to organise long- and broad-term strategies to adapt or transform. 
However, if a risk is imminent and a regime shift is impending or ongoing, the process 
manager may decide to skip or modify their approach to Steps 1, 2 and 3. 
Communication, openness and transparency are central to the process and key at 
all stages. The effective management of systemic risks requires a common fundamental 
understanding on the part of all relevant stakeholders that these are success factors 
for the governance of systemic risks. While this also holds for the management of 
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conventional risks, it is even more relevant for systemic risks that are notoriously hard to 
perceive due to difficulties in identifying causal relationships, psychological barriers and 
(often) long latency periods. The establishment of platforms or roundtables for sharing views 
and concerns, and providing information about systemic risks, is a prerequisite for creating 
awareness of an existing need for action and the necessary acceptance of the available 
management options. 
The following sections provide detailed descriptions of each step, and respective objectives, 
required actions, expected outcomes, as well as key success factors.
Figure 4: Elements of IRGC’s Systemic Risks Governance Guidelines. 
The smaller figure provides an illustration that the sequence is flexible and can be arranged differently or adapted to 
better align with specific cases, and organise ‘on-demand’ interaction and iteration. The process may be non-linear and 
non-sequential, to provide support to managers in a variety of situations, such as when they face an impending systemic 
disruption or if they have time and resources to elaborate long-term strategies.
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STEP 1 – EXPLORE THE SYSTEM,  
DEFINE ITS BOUNDARIES AND DYNAMICS
KEY OBJECTIVE: EXPLORE AND FRAME THE SYSTEM IN WHICH THE ORGANISATION 
OPERATES, AND DEFINE ITS POSITION WITHIN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT
Step 1 involves scanning, observing and analysing the organisation’s internal and external 
environment and boundaries, and developing an initial understanding of the system 
in which the organisation operates and develops. It also considers whether important 
transitions are ongoing
Required 
actions
• Environment scanning: Observe the environment for potential precursors of major 
changes and transitions that might affect the organisation (horizon scanning, early-
warning)
• Taking a ‘systems thinking’ approach
• Interacting with others to understand possible ongoing transitions of the system or 
around it
Expected 
outcomes
• Characterisation of the environment / context regarding opportunities and risks, 
including an overview of the interconnections and networks between the organisation 
and external players
• Definition of the boundaries of the system in scope for the organisation
• Understanding the direction in which the system seems to be heading, indicating 
possible transitions
• Understanding key external triggers of change
Key 
success 
factors
• Institutional capacity (skills, funding) for environment scanning
• Diversity of information
• Scientific soundness of data collection, analysis and prioritisation
• Data reliability and consistency
• Effective communication of early-warning findings to decision-makers
• Willingness and ability to act upon early-warning / faint signals
Step 1 aims to explore, frame and define the boundaries of the system in which the 
organisation operates and develops. It involves:
• Scanning, observing, and analysing the internal and external environment.
• Developing an initial understanding of the system in which the organisation operates, 
including its boundaries.
• Considering whether important transitions are ongoing, which can provide information 
about ongoing dynamics.
Important actions include characterising the system and identifying potential precursors of 
major changes and transitions that might affect the organisation (horizon scanning, early-
warning) and might represent systemic risks to the organisation. Communication and 
collaboration with others to understand interconnections and possible frictions as well as 
possible ongoing transitions of the system or around it are also key features.
System characterisation
A system is characterised by its organising principles and mission as well as the critical 
functions and services that it must deliver in normal operating mode. Firstly, it is essential 
to screen and analyse an organisation’s internal boundaries to understand how a given 
system operates, acknowledging though that attempting to define boundaries should 
be seen as a heuristic to make analysis possible – not as an actual decidable fact. 
Understanding the internal environment and boundaries of a system helps to (a) identify 
the components or sub-systems that must operate efficiently for the larger system to 
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survive, (b) better understand the areas where an intervention may be undertaken to 
strengthen a system’s ability to absorb, recover from, and adapt to systemic risks over 
time (NAS, 2012), and (c) identify communication weaknesses in the system. Secondly, 
it is important to identify the external environment and boundaries of a system. This may 
allow to prescribe a normative value regarding how important such a system is to an 
individual, organisation, or society (i.e., how much benefit do we get from a given system 
when it is operating normally). 
As soon as a system has been defined and the internal environment and boundaries 
analysed (i.e., the focal scale), it is important to identify and describe the interconnections 
with other systems (via external boundaries) and possible frictions. Boundaries are 
a necessary yet artificial construct to make sense of risks, but organisations need 
to realise what the impact of the very choice of boundaries is on systemic risks. 
Structurally, systemic risks are driven by the interconnected and nested nature of various 
infrastructural, social, economic, informational, and environmental systems (RSA-WWF, 
2014). Large systems (say homeland security in the U.S.) are composed of sub-systems 
(e.g., disease control, prevention of terrorism and criminality, efficient transportation 
networks, protection against severe weather) that are often interconnected amongst 
themselves. As such, a disruption to one such system can have a cascading impact that 
negatively influences others (i.e., a failure of dams or levees against tropical storms can 
severely degrade transportation networks and public health facilities to meet demand in 
an emergency scenario). In social-ecological systems, transitions into and out of a crisis 
mode must involve analysing interactions between different risks, between risks and 
subsystems and between subsystems themselves (Haas, Ye, Shi & Jaeger, 2015; Scheffer, 
2009). Step 1 is designed to allow organisations to explore their operational needs and the 
structure of their system, which in later steps will allow them to better deal with systemic 
threats.
The process in Step 1 of exploring the internal and external environments and boundaries 
requires one to acknowledge the role of human decision-making and analytical 
capabilities to understand systemic risks. The nature of systemic risks (often low 
probability but high consequence events) challenges human decision-making due to 
our reliance upon availability heuristics and proxy data, which often leads to subjective 
assessment. Though such decision-making allows humans to meet ongoing challenges 
of the current day, such decision processes are biased. They focus upon more recent 
risk events over those with older or more limited rates of occurrence. In other words, it 
is easy to place importance upon systemic risks that are visibly ongoing, yet such focus 
diminishes over time as new concerns arise (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002). As such, 
where Step 1 is designed to explore a system and understand its dynamics, it is important 
to be mindful of any potential biases and current perceptions of systemic risks that could 
cause one to overlook a critical system component.
The characterisation of the system in which ‘systemic’ risks materialise poses a different 
challenge than the characterisation of emerging risks. Rather than imagining future 
developments based on weak signals detected in the environment (the core challenge 
for emerging risk characterisation), systemic risks require one to invest in knowledge 
(supported by facts and evidence) and models as an initial task. It can also be helpful to 
analyse how organisations have faced previous stresses, as that information may suggest 
where future vulnerabilities may arise. In this regard, new knowledge management tools, 
modelling exercises, and data arrays provide unprecedented opportunities for anticipating 
future threats. Further, analysing contributing factors to risk emergence can be helpful in 
exploring changes in the system (see Section 5.1).
Environment scanning
Observing the environment for potential precursors of major changes and transitions that 
might affect the organisation is a task of the utmost importance for various ecological, 
social, and economic systems today. This includes scanning the horizon for weak signals 
that may indicate shifts in existing trends or situations and tracking factors known to 
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contribute to the emergence of risks. In addition to weak signals, statistical early-warning 
signals (s-EWS) 2 can inform risk assessors and decision-makers about the proximity of 
a regime shift. These s-EWS can complement weak signals, by providing a quantifiable 
metric of the imminence of change. Questions remain, however, as to whether s-EWS are 
sufficiently early (advanced), robust, reliable and useful (see Section 5.2 for more details). 
While they cannot predict when a regime shift is going to happen (as they only ‘kick in’ 
once the shift begins to unfold), statistical EWS can be an integral part of a continuous 
and quantitative system monitoring process.
Communication and collaboration with others
Dialogue, interaction and collaboration with others are critical to helping an organisation 
understand its external boundaries and its dynamic environment. Organisations 
have incomplete information regarding the state of their external boundaries, making 
collaboration with organisations along one’s boundary beneficial to gain a better 
understanding of how a larger network of systems operates. As an expected outcome of 
Step 1, such collaboration helps characterise a given organisation’s environment more 
robustly and can help it acquire insight into early warning signals for systemic risks that 
the organisation may not have access to, or may not be aware of. Examples of such 
communication and collaboration can include international datasets for global megatrends 
(i.e., climate change), industry consortia (i.e., shared best practices for an industrial 
sector), or international agreements and research efforts (i.e., modelling and analysis of 
potential impacts of space weather), among others. 
Additional references and background material for Step 1 are provided in 
Section 4.2 about systems thinking, as well as in 5.2 about early-warning systems 
and statistical early-warning signals , and Section 8 about systems thinking for 
innovation in the public sector (OECD, 2017).
2 Namely temporal s-EWS (e.g., critical slowing down and flickering), spatial s-EWS (e.g., spatial clustering), and 
signals based on power spectra (e.g., increased volatility in low frequency domains)
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Important recommendations for action
• It is essential to define and understand one’s system, and relevant sub-systems, 
and their dynamics. Characterising and analysing internal and external system 
boundaries are important for identifying the internal and external critical factors of 
functioning.
• Scanning for possible systemic risks, and transitions that may trigger systemic 
changes, is a task of the utmost importance for various ecological, social, and 
economic systems today. It is critical for system sustainability and survival. 
• Given the multifaceted nature of systemic risks, these two tasks cannot be 
performed well without collaborating with others. Identifying opportunities for 
collaboration and communication to explore external boundaries, and a given 
organisation’s general operating environment, can help them better understand 
their exposure to other systems as well as acquire and understand data to help 
determine the direction where their organisation is heading.
Expected outcome of Step 1
• Characterisation of the environment regarding opportunities and risks, including an 
overview of the interconnections and networks between the organisation and external 
players.
• Definition of the position of the system in a dynamic and complex context including 
boundaries of the system in scope.
• Understanding of the direction in which the system in scope seems to be heading.
• Understanding of key external triggers of change, such as regulation, which can work 
both ways.
• Development of communication and collaboration strategies for external boundaries 
and triggers for change – particularly in situations where it is difficult for an organisation 
to independently acquire information to explore and frame their external environment.
At this stage, organisations can move to Step 2 to develop scenarios and then 
define their goal.
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STEP 2 – DEVELOP SCENARIOS
KEY OBJECTIVE: EXPLORE POSSIBLE FUTURE EVOLUTIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND 
ORGANISATION-RELEVANT RISKS, CONSIDERING POSSIBLE ONGOING AND FUTURE 
TRANSITIONS
Step 2 involves deepening the understanding of key elements and critical functions of the 
system and sub-systems under consideration, and reviewing the dynamics of possible 
future interactions within the interconnected risk landscape. Then Step 2 unpacks how 
organisations can evolve and develop, considering the potential systemic risks that may 
impact them
Required 
actions
• Using information from Step 1 on systemic exploration, seek to deepen the 
understanding of interconnections and forces that can trigger a change or possibly 
disrupt a regime, from either the inside or the outside
• Identify and monitor critical system functions within such scenarios
• Modelling (e.g., using agent-based models)
• Develop scenarios of future developments (’alternative futures’)
• Include low-probability scenarios as a means to understand the scope and intensity 
of risk events that could endanger the entire operation of the organisation and its 
environment
Expected 
outcomes
• Improved understanding of key system characteristics and dynamics (driving forces and 
dynamics, thresholds, tipping points, early-warning signs of impending shifts, triggers 
for disruptions and change, windows of opportunity for interventions, etc.)
• Explorative scenarios of possible developments of the system, or the organisation, or 
the systemic risks that may affect them, with the clear framing of the systemic risks to 
the organisation
• Communication of the resulting understanding of how the system develops; making 
sense of the system for key actors within the organisation
Key 
success 
factors
• Taking a ‘systems thinking’ approach
• Sufficient investments in data, research and tools
• Relevance, credibility and legitimacy; plausibility of the scenarios
• Creativity (thinking outside of the box)
Step 2 aims to explore possible future evolutions of the system and organisation-relevant 
systemic risks, considering ongoing and potential transitions. This step particularly 
concerns the development and analysis of multiple scenarios, which are efforts to 
understand possible futures. This step involves:
• Deepening the understanding of key elements and critical functions of the system and 
sub-systems under consideration.
• Reviewing the dynamics of possible future interactions within the interconnected risk 
landscape. This requires making sense of the interconnections and forces that can 
trigger a change or possibly disrupt a regime, from either the inside or the outside.
• Developing scenarios of how systemic risks could impact the organisation and 
scenarios of future developments (alternative futures). It is wise to include low 
probability scenarios as a means to understand the scope and intensity of risk events 
that could endanger the entire operation of the organisation and its environment. 
• Modelling (e.g., using agent-based models, see Section 5.3).
It is important to note that scenario development in Step 2 is not geared towards 
quantifying via probabilistic risk assessment how likely a given threat may develop. 
Rather, this Step is intended to allow stakeholders to review how their system performs 
across a variety of situational conditions – allowing for a greater understanding of how the 
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system’s interconnections and interdependencies might trigger a cascading effect and 
threaten the ability of the system to function as expected. One example of such activity 
includes financial stress tests, which consist of a variety of scenarios to review how large 
banks would respond to various financial threats given the banks' current operating 
procedures, access to capital, and other concerns. In this way, scenarios allow for a richer 
understanding of how a system operates, and may suggest options to reduce its potential 
for cascading risk and/or improve its response to disruption of key sub-systems.
Scenario development
Step 2 is where organisations invest in exploration and simulation exercises to assess 
how they may develop and grow over time. Given various developmental scenarios, 
organisations then consider how their system, within a certain developmental path, 
can be impacted by systemic risks within the landscape, and what that means for the 
achievement of their goals. In the context of systemic risks, scenarios are not necessarily 
quantitative but are rather narratives that 'play' with different trigger-consequence 
relationships within the risk landscape. Scenarios must thus be forward-looking 
(‘foresight’) but also look to horizontally interconnected systems (‘broadsight’), to develop 
alternative futures (Tourki, Keisler & Linkov, 2013).
Various sources of information should be considered for scenario development. Big data, 
data analytics and artificial intelligence, as well as network science, can help to make 
sense of interconnections. These allow the user to acquire a sense of the plausibility of 
various scenarios by utilising an evidence base and connection of (future) scenarios to 
events that have happened in the past or present. 
Likewise, qualitative exploratory scenarios of plausible futures (narratives, or storylines) 
can be equally useful in exploring various scenarios ‘in play’ in a complex interconnected 
system, as well as in identifying goals for how one would like a system to operate 
under shock or stress. They can be a key feature of effective preparedness for future 
development of systemic risks (Nauser, 2015), especially if they aim to propose a vision 
of a desirable state of the system, accompanied by a backcasting approach to reach the 
vision. The question that is asked during the development of such scenarios is, "How 
could the system evolve?" This can enhance the ability to expand one’s imagination 
beyond the limits of experience, which can be described by the concept of “disciplined 
imagination,” developed to explain the process of theory construction in organisational 
studies (Weick, 1989; Cornelissen, 2006).
Understanding key characteristics of complex systems is important for anticipating events 
that may require policy interventions and identification of where those interventions 
should or could occur for maximum efficiency (OECD, 2011). The use of scenario-based 
reviews of system operations can identify weak points in a system's critical functions 
(in other words, areas that could trigger a negative cascading feedback loop that could 
cripple system functionality) and/or identify strategies for a system to transition to a more 
favourable state before, during, and after a shock takes place.
Additional references and background material for Step 2 are provided in Section 5 
(Foresight, ‘broadsight’ and early-warning systems), along with additional 
background information on systems thinking and complexity in Section 4.
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Expected outcome of Step 2
• Explorative scenarios of possible developments of the system, the risks and the 
organisation; framing of the systemic risks to the organisation.
• Communication of the resulting understanding of how the system develops: making 
sense of the system for key actors within the organisation.
At the end of Step 2, policymakers and other relevant decision-makers should be 
able to identify various pathways by which their organisation may develop and 
change, as well as how such developments may alter their exposure to systemic 
risks. Such understanding affords opportunities for improvement of systems that 
are likely to experience degradation or collapse due to a variety of shocks or 
stresses, and prepare for transitions if necessary.
Important recommendations for action
• Scenario development is one essential step to make sense of systemic risks.
• Scenario-based exercises can help stakeholders to prepare for transition.
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STEP 3 – DETERMINE GOALS AND LEVEL OF 
TOLERABILITY FOR RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
KEY OBJECTIVE: SET GOALS FOR THE ORGANISATION, CONSIDERING POSSIBLE 
SCENARIOS AND ONGOING OR ANTICIPATED TRANSITIONS 
Step 3 serves to develop the organisation’s vision or goal regarding risks and 
opportunities, considering its level of tolerability for risk and uncertainty (or risk appetite)
Required 
actions
• The list of system components (Step 1) and scenarios (Step 2) is reviewed by the Board, 
which will make decisions about its strategy
Expected 
outcomes
• A list of the organisation’s short-, mid-, and long-term objectives
Key 
success 
factors
• Leadership 
• Holistic view
• Engagement with important internal stakeholders
The objective of Step 3 is to determine the goals that an organisation will seek to 
achieve as determined by its Board. An inherent consideration of such goals includes the 
organisation’s appetite for risk, which determines the level of exposure to potential harms 
that the organisation is willing to operate under. Risk appetite is determined by various 
characteristics – such as cultural, institutional, and socio-economic factors – and can shift 
over time due to experience or exposure to risk (or lack thereof).
The goal-setting process should account for various time periods into the future, including 
near-term, intermediate-term, and long-term objectives. Such a separation of goals 
by time period can inform the immediate actions that an organisation will take in its 
operations (i.e., near-term economic goals), as well as its aspirations for where it would 
like to be and how it would like to improve over time (i.e., achieving sustainability and 
accountability in its operations) (National Research Council, 2014). This process can help 
identify opportunities to make long-term goals a reality, while also defining how exposure 
to systemic risks can influence an organisation’s capability to meet such goals.
One exercise that is helpful for goal creation is to explore various scenarios, developed 
in Step 2, that reflect likely conditions under which an organisation may be required 
to operate. Scenarios inform decision-making about the capacity for adaptation, risk 
appetite, estimated time for reaction in case of crisis, and availability of reduction, 
mitigation and adaptation. Scenario-based exercises can be reviewed methodologically 
via agent-based models or game theoretic approaches, and can elucidate how choices 
made by an organisation can bring it closer to or further away from achieving its desired 
goals.
Key success factors for Step 3 centre upon the institutional need for visionary leadership 
to explore and establish organisational goals, as well as a broad frame of mind to explore 
how such goals are impacted by various events.
Additional references and background material for Step 3 are provided in Section 5 
(Foresight, ‘broadsight’ and early-warning systems) along with considerations 
about global environmental systemic risks in Section 6 and risk governance for 
climate adaptation in Section 7.
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Expected outcome of Step 3
• A clear vision and goal for the organisation, including, if possible, how it aims to 
navigate transitions.
• An understanding of organisational objectives in the short, intermediate, and long-term.
At this stage, the organisation will be able to develop a management strategy that 
accounts for tolerability for risk and uncertainty.
Important recommendations for action
• Setting goals includes not only short- to mid-term business or economic goals, 
but also more normative goals such as improving sustainability, increasing 
accountability and responsibility, building competitive advantage, distributing 
wealth in a better way, or achieving more inclusive economic growth.
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STEP 4 – CO-DEVELOP MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
KEY OBJECTIVE: DEVELOP MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SYSTEMIC RISKS 
THAT AFFECT OR MAY AFFECT THE ORGANISATION 
Step 4 serves to co-develop  – with other actors in the system – strategies for addressing 
systemic risks in a proactive, effective, cost-efficient and adaptive manner. This often 
requires ‘navigating transitions’
Required 
actions
• Engage and collaborate with other actors in the system to co-develop solutions with 
them
• Set objectives for each intervention (keep status quo, adapt to incremental changes, or 
transform the organisation or the system)
Expected 
outcomes
• A list of management strategies to address the scenarios developed in Step 2, including 
anticipatory (proactive) and adaptive (reactive) mechanisms to improve a system's 
capacity to absorb and recover from shocks and stresses, and adapt to new context 
conditions or transform itself if needed
• A selection of specific measures to build resilience to uncertain and unknown shocks 
and stresses
Key 
success 
factors
• Consistency with organisational values and culture
• Flexibility for adaptation and adjustment in the face of new evidence
• Creation of an institutional space for innovation and trial and error
• Engagement with all internal and external stakeholders
Step 4 aims to develop management strategies to deal with systemic risks that affect or 
may affect the organisation. It involves:
• developing strategies for addressing systemic risks in a proactive, effective, cost-
efficient, and adaptive manner.
• a willingness and capacity to flexibly ‘navigate’ transitions.
The creation and implementation of management strategies to adequately govern 
systemic risks requires considering exposure and vulnerability, engaging and collaborating 
with other actors to co-develop solutions with them, and setting goals for each 
intervention (keep status quo, go back to prior regime, adapt to incremental changes, or 
transform the organisation or the system). Where systemic risks are multifaceted, complex 
and have uncertain outcomes, strategies must address the need to:
(1) Reduce system exposure and vulnerability to various shocks and stresses. 
Should such a shock or stress occur, a reduction in system exposure to the 
consequences of such a shock would make it less severely affected, and fewer 
resources would be needed to achieve full system recovery. Furthermore, promoting 
redundancy in a system’s network structure, such as with the case of backup 
systems running in parallel, can mitigate damages caused by system outages. Further 
strategies here include optimisation of network complexity and the creation of firewalls 
or security breaks, which facilitate quick decomposition or de-compartmentalisation 
into disconnected or weakly connected subnetworks before a failure cascade has 
percolated through the whole system or large parts of it.
(2) Collaborate with others at the periphery of the system. 
Whereas systemic risks are inherently driven by a web of complex interaction effects 
between various sectors, a disruption in one area (i.e., severe weather) can have 
percolation effects that disrupt others (i.e., public health or local markets, among many 
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others). Addressing such systemic risks may require collaboration between public 
and private actors to overcome common obstacles (see Box 4). In doing so, the focus 
should be on systems building and overcoming behavioural, institutional, and human 
obstacles to collaboration, rather than strictly problem-solving. The management of 
interconnected risks requires the development of new decision-making frameworks 
and institutional capacity, and new types of regulatory arrangements between the 
public and the private sectors (see Box 5 for more discussion and examples).
Multi-stakeholder partnerships will inherently require some elements of value-chain 
analysis to transparently assess the role of each participant in the creation and 
use of a product or service. This could serve to provide incentives to those actors 
who contribute to reducing systemic risks by adding diversity, modularity or other 
components of resilience, in such a way that the supply chain can be more adaptive 
and able to re-organise if needed.
For example, ongoing initiatives to encourage transitions to circular economies will 
require collaboration between actors (see Box 5). Multi-stakeholder management 
teams should consider the role of individuals/consumers in the marketplace in order 
to understand larger-scale consumption trends and information asymmetries with the 
general public. Understanding public opinion, and working with the public to generate 
shared knowledge, can serve as a crucial step towards developing sustainable 
management solutions (Palma-Oliveira, Trump, Wood & Linkov, 2018).
(3) Prepare proactive measures to adapt or transform the system should a fundamental 
change occur. Organisations with the ability to prepare for and anticipate potential 
future shocks are better able to position themselves to prevent or mitigate the damage 
caused by systemic risks. Proactive measures pre-emptively address exposure to 
systemic risks, or the consequences of systemic risks, and can be a more effective 
and cost-efficient format to institute organisational response to such risks well before 
tipping points are reached (see 'Main strategic approaches to governing systemic risks' 
below).
(4) Consider planned adaptive governance, an approach in which stakeholders decide 
together to design arrangements that will learn from experience and update over time. 
Such approaches foster an environment where operating procedures or organisational 
assumptions may be adjusted in the face of new or compelling information (see Box 6).
(5) Prepare for when a window of opportunity opens, which will make possible the 
actual decision and implementation of strategies to adapt or transform a system or an 
organisation (see Box 7).
Main strategic approaches to governing systemic risks
In line with mainstream recommendations for resilience building, and in acknowledgement 
of the governance needs noted above, IRGC proposes three main strategic approaches for 
dealing with systemic risks.
(1) Supporting and strengthening the ability of a system to self-organise and self-control. 
The first strategy is motivated by a preference to develop organic solutions to address 
systemic risks, provided certain conditions of social acceptance are met. Helbing 
(2010) recommends supporting and strengthening the self-organisation and self-
control of a system, i.e., working with it rather than against it and using the immanent 
tendency of complex systems to self-organise and thereby create a stable, ordered 
state. This is an extension from biological systems that engage in ‘self-healing’ in order 
to overcome disruptions to biological processes. Self-healing is a critical component of 
system resilience, whereby such systems are able to better recover from and adapt to 
threats and disruptions from various sources. Critical considerations here include scale 
and time, whereby certain types of systems are more amenable to self-organisation 
and threat response than others, and certain critical functions within a system are 
more sensitive to threats and better able to adjust to them in a quick and efficient 
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manner. Self-healing is also discussed in the context of non-organic systems such as 
machine learning, where neural networks learn and adapt based upon environmental 
conditions to better structure information and provide more robust analysis of data. 
Self-organisation and self-control are derived from a system’s capacity to respond to 
stimuli, and use lessons learned to adjust system operations accordingly. However, 
not all systems are capable of self-organisation, or of utilising principles of self-
organisation in a manner that would allow them to optimally address threat and 
disruption without the serious risk of system losses and collapse. Furthermore, while 
this can help prevent brittleness and excessive complexity, it may be that a self-
organised system resulting from a spontaneous change in the system is not what 
managers want to have, given their goals. In that case, more proactive strategies may 
be necessary.
(2) Pro-active intervention strategies: Prevention, mitigation, adaptation and 
transformation.
The second strategy promotes active intervention to prevent or change the system 
and/or its potential for cascading failure. This includes four different forms of proactive 
interventions: (a) a prevention-based approach, (b) using mitigation as far as possible, 
(c) an adaptation-based approach, and (d) a transformation-based approach. Each of 
these approaches must work within the political, economic, and institutional realities 
for the system within which they are implemented, and each has their own strengths 
and weaknesses that must be considered for the management of systemic risks.
• Prevention is concerned with averting or at least reducing the likelihood of 
regime shifts. This includes altering critical thresholds or increasing the system’s 
capacity to absorb changes. Interventions include fostering long-term visions, 
proactive intervention on slow variables, exploring new development pathways, and 
diversifying options for societal response. An example is building flood defences to 
reduce vulnerability to sea level rise. However, such strategies can sometimes also 
make a system more vulnerable; for instance, when higher dykes give a feeling of 
security, which results in increased building activity in flood-prone areas, ultimately 
leading to higher losses in the case of dyke failure. 
• Mitigation may be a worthwhile approach when the causality link between 
cause and impact are easy to identify and not affected by too much interaction 
with other risk systems. For example, some direct causes of climate change or 
loss of biodiversity can be addressed by mitigation strategies such as public 
regulation. While mitigation strategies should definitely be part of the portfolio of 
risk management tools, they are however rarely suitable to deal with the complex 
systemic risks that are the focal point of this document.
• Adaptation consists of measures for preserving societal and ecosystem functions 
in new regimes. It is the optimal strategic response if prevention is not possible or 
its costs are too high, or if pre- and post-tipping regimes are similar over relevant 
timescales. It can take the form of adaptation to gradual changes, to abrupt 
changes, and to second-order effects such as an increased frequency of extreme 
events. An example is adapting agricultural practices to changing climate conditions. 
It could be the organisation that adapts to new system conditions, or the system 
that is adapted to other systems with which it is connected. 
• Transformation is based on the logic that there is a window of opportunity to 
catalyse a positive regime shift and let the system evolve on newly improved 
trajectories. It typically involves initiating changes at lower scales while maintaining 
the resilience of the system at higher scales as the transformation proceeds, until 
the feedbacks in the new stability domain are sufficiently established. An example is 
the energy transition in Germany or the transformation to a circular economy (CEPS, 
2017). Successful transformations require technological and social innovation, 
and leadership and adaptive management (Geels, 2002). Innovations outside the 
dominant regime, such as new technologies, new social practices or new business 
models, can be catalysts for systemic change. Hallmarks of governance for 
transformation also include inclusiveness, adaptiveness and distributed deliberation 
(Klinke, 2017).
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(3) Prepare for disruptions, accidents and crises.
The third strategy balances the objectives of the first two by actively preparing for 
future threat scenarios without necessarily proactively intervening within various 
interconnected systems. This strategy builds the capacity of various stakeholders 
to help their system address and overcome future shocks and stresses. It includes 
the creation of scenario-based plans for emergency and recovery. For example, the 
severity of extreme weather events can result from climate-related systemic risks and 
can trigger cascading systemic risks, such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina (New 
Orleans, 2005), Harvey (Texas, August 2017), and Irma (Florida, September 2017). The 
disaster that followed Hurricane Katrina prompted the design and implementation of 
effective strategies to prepare for disruptions of critical infrastructure services. Those 
strategies were developed and fully effective when Harvey and Irma hit the coasts.
These strategies can be combined or implemented successively if proximity to a regime 
shift seems to increase.
Additional references and background material for Step 4 are provided in Section 3 
(Resilience) and Section 4.5 (Leverage points for intervention within a system).
Expected outcome of Step 4
• A list of management strategies to address the scenarios developed in Step 2 and the 
goals determined in Step 3.
• A selection of specific measures to build resilience to absorb and recover from shocks, 
but also adapt to fundamental change and transform the organisation and system if 
desired.
• The creation of an institutional space for innovation and trial and error.
At this stage, the organisation is ready to decide on a strategy, but must also 
prepare for unanticipated obstacles.
Important recommendations for action
• To develop management strategies for systemic risks, it is essential to understand 
where a system’s windows of opportunity may arise and identify the leverage 
points to drive systemic transitions to a more desirable state, as well as to 
identify factors, drivers, and other indicators that unveil when such windows of 
opportunity and leverage points may be in play.
• To address systemic risks that evolve in the context of transitions, resilience must 
promote adaptation or transformation of the system.
• It is useful to test different strategies by using simulations and virtual experiments. 
If major problems occur in the simulations or if new systemic risks evolve, the 
strategies can be corrected before they manifest themselves in real life.
• It is necessary to consider the effects of regulations and rules, and to inform 
public decision-makers about needed reforms of the regulatory system, perhaps 
in contrast to actions to alter organisational culture and values.
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Box 4: Common obstacles to collaboration in the development  
of management strategies – Groupthink and silos
A critical concern in information-sharing for strategy design is the potential for lock-ins such 
as silos and groupthink to neglect signals and formally acknowledge that a critical disruption 
is upcoming (which should trigger immediate action), or to diminish the potential for the 
transparent sharing of information. The tendency to ‘silo,’ or cause expertise to form in small 
and self-contained groups that do not communicate well with one another, is well documented 
in various scientific endeavours. The September 11 terrorist attacks are a prime example of 
this, where differing intelligence agencies each had pieces of information on terrorist operations 
that, if combined, may have been able to thwart some or all of the hijacking attempts. Likewise, 
groupthink reinforces a ‘yes-man’ tendency where members of a group assume that some 
collective idea is the correct one, and little is done to question the veracity of that given course 
of action in favour of a differing approach. Overcoming groupthink requires a participatory 
approach to decision-making in a way that accounts for a broad diversity of opinions, 
experiences, and perspectives.
Box 5: Examples of public-private / supply-chain collaboration  
for systemic risk management and resilience
Dealing with systemic risks requires boosting collaboration among actors. The governance 
of inter-connected risks requires the development of new decision-making frameworks and 
institutional capacity, and new types of regulatory arrangements between the public and the 
private sectors. Incentives could be provided to those actors who contribute to reducing 
systemic risks by adding diversity, modularity or other components of resilience, in such a 
way that those value chains can be more adaptive and able to re-organise if needed. Such 
approaches can include adapted measures from previous communication and reporting 
infrastructure, or new collaborative arrangements altogether.
For an example of adapting existing measures, the US Center for Disease Control (CDC) in 
Atlanta, is required to coordinate with dozens of partners to better prepare for potential future 
pandemics. Epidemiologic testing and protocol is well established and precautionary in nature, 
yet is required to adapt to novelties or complexities posed to a given disease. Due to the global 
nature of such epidemiologic work, the CDC is required to work with multiple partners in the 
public and private sectors in a manner that coordinates a normalised process of acquiring, 
analysing, and reporting disease information in a timely manner.
For an example of new collaborative arrangements, ozone depletion due to the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) required an international arrangement to reduce the commercial 
use of CFCs. This international agreement via the Montreal Protocol of 1987 fostered a phase-
out plan for the use of CFCs in various contexts (inclusive of input from industry developers) 
and suggested regulatory mechanisms that could be adopted by individual governments. This 
case serves as an example of how public-private collaboration can address systemic risks 
before harmful system transitions can occur through the use of early-warning signals.
As an example of on-going transformations, consider the case of the transition to a circular 
economy as a strategy to mitigate systemic risks related to over-consumption of certain natural 
resource. Alliances (or other forms of high-level collaboration across the value chain) must be 
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Box 6: Planned Adaptive Governance
Regardless of the chosen strategy, planned adaptive approaches generated through multi-
stakeholder collaboration are likely essential to govern systems against systemic threats. 
Planned adaptive governance, and its application to regulation in 'planned adaptive regulation,' 
is an approach in which stakeholders decide together to design arrangements that will learn 
from experience and update over time. In complex systems and in the face of systemic risks, 
the evidence is uncertain or changing. The knowledge used to underpin a rule or a governing 
arrangement, whether public or private, binding or non-binding, will change over time. Overall, 
efforts to institute planned adaptive governance require stakeholders to use ‘windows of 
opportunity’ within which they can prepare their system to avoid disruption, or even transition 
their system to a more desirable state that is less exposed to systemic risks in the future.
Planned adaptive governance is difficult to implement because it creates additional uncertainty 
for stakeholders, especially those that need to make long-term decisions, such as regulated 
industries that make long-term investments, or legislators that cannot frequently revise the laws 
that structure technical regulations. It is still rare to see a purposeful combination of: 
• Planning for future review and revision of governance arrangements
• Monitoring of performance and impact of existing arrangements
• Funding of targeted research organised in a way that is credibly overseen for quality and 
relevance and that explicitly feeds into the reassessment of the evidence base.
However, planned adaptive governance is a policy tool that is too infrequently considered. It is 
appropriate for risk issues whose comprehensive assessment is evolving because of changes 
in the technologies or in context conditions. It is already applied in the environmental and 
medicine sector, which are both prone to systemic risks. It has been used for the regulation of 
criteria pollutants in the atmosphere (in the US National Ambient Air Quality Standards and the 
European Air Quality Standards), in the US Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act of June 2016, in 
flood management in the Netherlands, and in adaptive licensing of new drugs by the European 
Medicines Agency.
formed to engage in fundamental business transformation. This is necessary to overcome the 
barriers to circular economy and causes of systemic risks such as: 
• Under-pricing of commodities, since this generates overconsumption of materials and natural 
resources
• Lack of deliberate planning for circular economies in product design and development
• Complicated logistics management, due to little collaboration among producers, suppliers 
and consumers
• Absence of robust markets for used or recycled products.
In general, success factors for effective collaboration include (Bresch, Berghuijs & Kupers, 
2014):
• Alignment of interests, or shared goals. Each actor must understand their and others’ roles, 
expectations and constraints in the value chain
• Understanding and alignment of incentive systems
• Sharing of risks and opportunities, sharing of resources and infrastructure
• Using crises as triggers for change.
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Box 7: Windows of opportunity to intervene in a system in transition
When risks in complex systems build up slowly, they are often foreseeable, but nonetheless 
rarely avoidable. IRGC has described such risks as slow-developing catastrophic risks (IRGC, 
2013) and argues that their slow-developing feature implicates the existence of windows of 
opportunity for intervention measures.
Windows of opportunity represent key moments or developments when signals of an impending 
regime shift become visible, and it will be possible to move from preparing the transformation of 
a system and navigating the transformation towards an improved organisational configuration. 
Acknowledging that a regime shift is inherently difficult to undertake and that many systems 
are structured to favour the status quo, windows of opportunity are often triggered by actions 
or events that ease the potential for a system to change its organisation or behaviour in various 
ways. In a normatively positive sense, transformations occur when a window of opportunity 
is used to initiate a change within a system or organisation that propels it onto an improved 
trajectory.
Windows of opportunity for transformation typically involve initiating changes at lower 
scales, possibly through niche innovations (Raven, Van den Bosch & Weterings, 2010), while 
maintaining the resilience of the system at higher scales as the transformation proceeds until 
the feedbacks in the new stability domain are sufficiently established (see also Section 6.2).
The time window or management timeline for effective outcomes also determines how much 
advance warning is needed and whether it is possible to rely on them. The time window 
depends on at least three factors: regime shift drivers, managerial inertia, and system inertia 
and variability (Contamin & Ellison, 2009; Nursimulu, 2015a).
1. Regime-shift drivers
• The type of driver matters: Averting regime shifts driven by slow drivers requires much 
earlier detection and intervention than those driven by fast drivers. 
• Fishery collapse, for example, can happen because of fast drivers, like over-fishing, or 
slow drivers, like shoreline development. Timely policy decisions to reduce harvesting can 
have a rapid impact and can avert potential regime shift in less than a decade, but policy 
decisions to restore shorelines need about four decades to be effective in avoiding a 
regime shift.
2. Managerial inertia
• Managerial inertia in the system refers to the speed at which intervention can be initiated.
• Delayed intervention can arise due to factors such as lack of political will, difficulty to get 
buy-in from relevant actors or sectors, scientific uncertainty, or a lack of ‘solutions.’
3. System inertia variability
• The intrinsic variability of complex adaptive systems influences the power of regime shift 
indicators, i.e., the extent to which the indicator can detect an impending regime shift with 
reasonable certainty and with sufficient lead time for effective intervention.
• System variability also blurs the predictability of system behaviour and the impact of 
interventions.
• For effective intervention, it is critical to identify key management entry points, i.e., drivers 
and feedbacks that can leverage change in the system, based on its specific interaction 
patterns.
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STEP 5 – ADDRESS UNANTICIPATED BARRIERS 
AND SUDDEN CRITICAL SHIFTS
KEY OBJECTIVE: IDENTIFY AND PRO-ACTIVELY ADDRESS UNANTICIPATED OBSTACLES, 
WHICH MAY COME UP DURING THE SYSTEMIC RISK GOVERNANCE PROCESS AND WHICH 
MAY REQUIRE SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONS
Uncertain and cascading consequences often imply that not everything has been identified 
and addressed beforehand. Step 5 addresses any unanticipated barriers to achieving the 
goals of an organisation and the effective management of systemic risks. Unexpected 
and sudden shocks may also prevent the effective deployment of transition strategies, 
especially when they involve critical disruptions that may trigger regime shifts or crises, 
and require urgent intervention. Step 5 is, therefore, a possible entry point in the process 
towards the governance of systemic risks
Required 
actions
• Watch out for barriers and lock-ins that may purposely ignore or hide information 
asymmetries, regulatory capture, or improper or biased incentives that earlier steps in 
the process may have overlooked
• Remove barriers and lock-ins, develop counter-measures
• Engage all relevant stakeholders in the resolution of unanticipated problems
Expected 
outcomes
• Unanticipated obstacles do not cause major disturbances to achieve the long-term goal
Key 
success 
factors
• Engaging / involving stakeholders in management actions to create legitimacy to act in 
whatever circumstances
• Incentivise key actors
• Develop organisational capabilities to ensure that management measures can be 
successfully implemented, even under severe constraints
• Transparency, agility, openness to innovation
The aim of Step 5 is to identify and pro-actively address unanticipated obstacles to 
strategies for the effective governance of systemic risks, which may come up during the 
process and may require specific interventions. Uncertainty and systemic cascading 
consequences often imply that not everything has been identified and addressed 
beforehand. For example, a long-term strategy for transformation may have been decided 
in Step 4, but an external shock disrupts its implementation. This can signal a need to 
adjust to new contextual facts and phenomena that were not previously accounted for, 
and to take steps to address, overcome, or even avoid disruption on route to strategy 
implementation. Step 5 thus addresses two concrete needs:
• Overcome any unanticipated barriers to achieving the goals of an organisation and the 
effective management of systemic risks 
• Prepare for unexpected and sudden shocks, which may also prevent the effective 
deployment of transition strategies, especially when they involve critical disruptions that 
may trigger regime shifts or crises and require urgent intervention.
Agility, early-warning, sense-making and the development of robust crisis management 
frameworks are key to help those in charge of crisis decision-making deal with the complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity that caracterise catastrophic events nowadays (OECD, 2015).
Required actions involve constantly watching out for typical barriers and lock-ins that may 
purposely ignore or hide information asymmetries, regulatory capture, improper or biased 
incentives that earlier steps in the process may have overlooked; removing constraints, 
developing counter-measures; actively engaging all relevant stakeholders in the resolution 
of unanticipated problems; and flexibility and agility.
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Important recommendations for action
• Barriers and obstacles are recurring threats within a comprehensive risk 
governance and implementation process, and should be actively sought out 
ahead of time through monitoring of signals or drivers.
• Governing systemic risks requires deliberative exercises to identify and overcome 
such barriers and obstacles before they strengthen.
• Even with the most sophisticated analysis of future developments, surprises may 
happen.
• Increased proximity to a regime shift, when it becomes visible, must trigger a 
rapid revision of an established strategy to face disruptions, catastrophes or 
crises. In urgent situations where the sudden materialisation of a systemic risk 
is imminent or ongoing, organisations may use Step 5 as an entry point into the 
governance process, and temporarily bypass Steps 1-3.
Unanticipated barriers to implementing the strategy co-developed in Step 4
Step 5’s primary objective is to identify and proactively address unanticipated obstacles 
(i.e., ‘barriers and constraints’) that may arise within strategies for an organisation 
to govern systemic risks – whereby such obstacles can negatively influence the 
implementation and adaptation of such strategies in Steps 6 and 7. These barriers 
and constraints might include, among others, the decision-making structure of an 
organisation, its social culture, or limited availability of relevant information to make 
informed decisions. One such recurring barrier includes neglected information asymmetry. 
Stakeholders from differing areas (government, industry, academia, NGOs), countries, and 
disciplinary sectors each may possess different bodies of information as well as differing 
opinions and beliefs regarding how a system should optimally function under stress. 
Sharing such information across stakeholders in a transparent manner is key to building a 
shared understanding of the systemic risks facing the various systems in question.
In this step, we consider ‘remaining’ barriers, especially those that are outside of the 
control of the organisation, and that may come in the way of constraints to the effective 
development of the management strategy. This also includes being aware that strategies 
of other organisations, or simply change, may bring new constraints, especially if 
strategies deployed in other connected systems are not taken into account. Ultimately, 
such preparation will help ensure that various barriers do not generate major disturbances 
to an organisation’s governance strategy for systemic risks.
An entry point in the process towards the governance of systemic risks
Additionally, Step 5 also serves as an entry point in the process where, should an 
organisation be faced with a sudden or immediate shock, the process manager may 
decide or have to skip Steps 1–4, and enter with Step 5. This is due to the general 
immediacy of the problem facing the organisation, where there is no time to conduct 
exploration and scenario development under Steps 1–3, and urgency dictates the need 
for the organisation to deal with sudden shifts in their system’s capacity, operations, or 
contextual information. Information from this sudden shock inherently requires decision-
makers to rethink their strategy to accommodate new contextual realities, and adjust their 
organisation’s operations in a manner that accounts for new information that may possibly 
be in conflict with previously held ideas or operational motivations.
Expected outcome of Step 5
• Unexpected obstacles to implement a relevant strategy are or can be overcome.
At this stage, the organisation should be ready to implement a strategy to address 
systemic risks that affect or may affect it, and navigate transition successfully.
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STEP 6 – DECIDE, TEST AND IMPLEMENT STRATEGIES
KEY OBJECTIVE: IMPLEMENT AN APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC RESPONSE
Step 6 deals with deciding, testing and implementing the most appropriate strategy to 
manage systemic risks to an organisation
Required 
actions
• In view of the obstacles and capabilities, evaluate and compare the options developed 
in Steps 4 and 5 and decide which ones to implement
• Test and experiment, if possible
• If an unexpected event is occurring, revise the strategy and adopt a crisis preparedness 
and management approach
• Allocate resources to match operational capabilities with strategy 
• Clearly define roles, responsibilities and incentives according to the strategic options 
adopted
• Support strategy implementation by ensuring adequate authority and leadership and 
enabling the creation of appropriate risk cultures
Expected 
outcomes
• Final decision as to which management option will be implemented
• Translation of the strategic objectives into individual and collective objectives at the 
various levels of the organisation
• Implementation of the decisions made
Key 
success 
factors
• Clear and transparent criteria for taking decisions
• Appropriate evidence and / or scenarios
• Inclusion of all relevant stakeholders
• Accountability / clarity about roles and responsibilities
Steps 6 aims to implement the most appropriate strategy to manage systemic risks to an 
organisation. It includes decision-making, testing and experimentation (if possible and 
necessary), and implementation.
The options developed in Step 4 will be evaluated and compared, considering obstacles 
and capabilities. Then one or several options will be decided and implemented. If an 
unexpected event occurs the strategy may have to be revised and crisis preparedness 
and management may have to be implemented (OECD, 2015). Appropriate resource 
allocation will be needed to match operational capabilities with strategy, as well as 
clear definition of roles, responsibilities and incentives. Finally, adequate authority and 
leadership will support strategy implementation and enable the creation of an appropriate 
risk culture.
Decision
The governance of systemic risks is challenged by the complexity, uncertainty, and 
potential ambiguity of the knowledge about systemic risks (Lowell, 2016). In situations 
of uncertainty, lack of knowledge, or distributed responsibilities, the challenge is to both 
collect sufficient evidence to base decisions on that scientific evidence, and to frame 
the conditions of shared and comprehensive distribution of knowledge (Merad, Dechy & 
Marcel, 2014). Where previous Steps were designed to explore a system's internal and 
external boundaries, identify signals of potential threats, and craft strategies to address 
those threats, Step 6 requires an organisation to decide upon, test, and implement the 
most appropriate identified strategy to manage the organisation’s systemic risks. 
Decisions about systemic risks require the ability of the decision or policy to perform well 
in the context of various identified possible futures. It is one of the qualities decision-
makers look for when choosing among different options. Therefore, decision-makers 
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will aim for robust decisions that can remain good enough under a range of possible 
outcomes. Robust decisions are those that either maintain enough flexibility for adaptation 
in the future or offer good performances for more than one of the future scenarios.
Due to lingering uncertainty and ambiguity regarding an organisation’s exposure to 
systemic risks, there may be different interpretations of the same knowledge, which may 
create conflicting views about the best decision. In this case, decision-makers will engage 
in dialogue and social learning with the public (where appropriate), to share the decision 
with others. A critical objective of such interactions is to articulate underlying assumptions 
for all policy options/decisions, and ultimately generate shared knowledge that is 
understood by all stakeholders to prevent confusion or disharmony in management. In 
any case, decision-making about systemic risks is always challenging for policymakers as 
well as senior management in private companies. 
Experimentation
Experimentation is likely a key component for the success of broader management 
strategies for systemic risks. Given the high degree of uncertainty and complexity 
facing interconnected systems in a spatially dispersed environment, testing potential 
management strategies on a smaller scale and within a more controlled environment can 
offer valuable experience and insight regarding how such a strategy might perform on a 
larger scale. It is helpful to note that many political frameworks inherently allow for smaller-
scale testing of policy options, such as with state-based regulatory experimentation in 
the United States. For example, various states such as Massachusetts and Tennessee 
experimented with state-based health care exchanges in the years prior to the passage of 
the Affordable Care Act (which had some lessons learned from these cases built into the 
law) (Ten Napel, Cohn & Martinez-Vidal, 2009). If errors in implementation are extremely 
costly or irreversible, it may be prudent to develop simulation or virtual spaces to test the 
decisions.
Implementation
Effective implementation of strategies for prevention, adaptation or transformation will 
require creating supportive conditions for the organisational, technical and cultural shifts 
that are necessary to lead and support the transition (Nursimulu, 2015a). Resilience 
is often regarded as the optimum strategy for dealing with systemic risks due to its 
inherent systems-focus on generating improved system recovery in the aftermath of a 
disruptive shock, although other tools and frameworks abound. Ultimately, successful 
implementation requires organisations to clearly define roles, responsibilities, and 
incentives for action by various players within their organisation. This ensures adequate 
leadership and authority that is relevant to a given organisational culture.
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Expected outcome of Step 6
• Final decision as to which management option will be implemented.
• Translation of the strategic objectives into individual and collective objectives at the 
various levels of the organisation.
• Implementation of the decisions made.
At this stage, a strategy and specific interventions are implemented. The final step 
will be to monitor performance and review decisions if needed.
Important recommendations for action
• Strategy selection requires deliberative thought, testing, and experimentation to 
help further its success.
• Particularly, experimentation allows one to ‘bound’ uncertainty in a manner where 
it is possible to understand the range of outcomes that a certain management 
strategy may have. Experiments should be designed in controlled circumstances, 
yet mimic natural activity and behaviour as much as possible. This can be through 
modelling exercises or live experimentation in small organisations.
• Robust strategies must be chosen since it enables organisations to navigate a 
range of possible futures, ensuring adherence to the chosen strategy (prevention, 
adaptation or transformation).
• Successful strategy implementation requires clearly defined roles, responsibilities 
and incentives, as well as a shared understanding of goals.
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STEP 7 – MONITOR, LEARN FROM STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATION, REVIEW AND ADAPT
KEY OBJECTIVE: REVIEW AND, IF NEEDED, ADAPT THE STRATEGY TO CHANGING RISK 
PATTERNS OR CIRCUMSTANCES
Step 7 involves monitoring how the system evolves and the risks unfold, reviewing the 
relevance and performance of the decisions taken and, if needed, adapting the strategy 
and modifying the course of action
Required 
actions
• Ex-ante decision to review
• Deploy monitoring capabilities
• Establish periodic reviews of strategic decisions, which integrate feedback from 
monitoring and new knowledge 
• Adapt where necessary
Expected 
outcomes
• Increased capacity to anticipate and execute adaptation to a more favourable 
organisational state
• By implementing a closed loop between monitoring, learning and decision-making, the 
final outcome is an increased overall resilience of the organisation, with the ability to 
adapt and transform in a dynamic environment
Key 
success 
factors
• Involvement of all internal stakeholders
• Open and transparent discussions
• Regular updates of strategic decisions based on new information
• Flexibility for adaptation and adjustment in the face of new evidence
Step 7 aims to review and, if needed, adapt the strategy to changing risk patterns or 
circumstances. It involves:
• regular monitoring of how the system evolves and how the risks unfold
• reviewing the relevance and performance of the decisions taken
• if needed, adapting the strategy and modifying the course of action.
Step 7 builds from previous organisational efforts in Step 4 to co-develop management 
strategies to address systemic risks to a given organisation, and applies this information 
to, if necessary, adapt the organisation to changing risk circumstances. The process 
should follow best practice recommendations for planned adaptive governance (see 
Box 6), i.e., it should be based on a closed loop between monitoring, learning and 
decision-making, including by taking ex-ante decision to revise the strategy if needed, 
deploying capabilities to monitor how the system develops and continue research to 
improve knowledge, integrating feedback from monitoring and new knowledge into the 
periodic reviews of strategic decisions, and adapting where necessary.
Even accounting for the unique contextual characteristics of a given organisation, 
adaptability is needed to iteratively address various threats to interconnected systems as 
well as the capacity for a disruption to one system to trigger outages in others. This allows 
organisations to determine what is working well, and what might need to be improved 
based on various performance metrics. Such an evaluation can then indicate areas within 
an organisation that should be improved to overcome limitations and improve operations. 
For example, adaptive governance may be driven by a legislative decision to monitor 
risks and review existing regulatory frameworks in the light of evolving landscape and 
risks. In that case, any regulatory instruments (hard law) must include clauses for regular 
revisions of risk assessment and management. Alternatively, adaptive governance may 
also be driven by voluntary arrangements among major affected stakeholders, and include 
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instruments such as codes of conduct (soft law) that may be modified as needed to meet 
emerging challenges posed by systemic risks.
Step 7 inherently includes the idea of learning from what has been implemented 
(even if it fails) and acquiring new knowledge. Adaptation is an iterative process that 
organisations operating in CAS should commit to, partly to avoid the creation of new 
lock-ins. As such, planned adaptive governance requires mechanistic approaches that 
allow multi-stakeholder groups to on-board lessons learned at various stages of the 
creation, implementation, and revision of their management strategies for systemic 
risks – thereby incorporating more robust data sources and experimental knowledge of 
system behaviours over time. This allows for continual improvement towards gradual and 
constructive transitions rather than sudden, unexpected, unwanted, or otherwise harmful 
disruptions. 
Expected outcome of Step 7
• Increased capacity to anticipate and execute adaptation to a more favourable 
organisational state. From such improved adaptive capacity, increased overall resilience 
of the organisation.
Important recommendations for action
• Regular monitoring and evaluation must take place to determine (a) what is 
working well, (b) what is working sub-optimally, and (c) what data or lessons have 
been acquired to better frame and structure the system or management strategy.
• Mechanistically, planned adaptive governance allows various decision-makers 
to integrate new information over time, and gradually improve their management 
strategy.
43IRGC Guidelines for the Governance of Systemic Risks  //
2.3  The role of the process manager or ‘navigator’
Developing and deploying a systematic process for the governance of systemic risks that 
supports strategic decision-making requires that a dedicated person in the organisation 
coordinates various kinds of technical expertise, challenges existing organisational 
routines, and facilitates the balancing of possible conflicting individual stakeholder 
objectives within and external to the organisation. 
The core tasks of the process manager are the following:
• Facilitating interaction among participants for collaboration, networking, learning and 
experimentation
• Bringing new knowledge to the organisation, and familiarising with multi-disciplinary 
work
• Validating and legitimising the technical methods and approaches used during the 
process, in view of pursuing the organisation’s objective
• Ensuring that scientific concepts are translated into understandable concepts for 
effective risk management and policy
• Working to break silos of whatever form (disciplines, sectors, stakeholder groups).
• Monitoring performances to demonstrate their relevance for the organisation (the 
internal process will be scrutinised for its capacity to provide effective and relevant 
outputs and benefits for the organisation)
• Organising capacity-building of all staff and promoting behaviours and attitudes 
adapted to the challenges of systemic risks
• Communicating internally and externally and engaging with system-relevant 
stakeholders outside the organisation, and working to create a common language 
about systemic risks
• Reporting and reviewing.
If the organisation deliberately engages in a transition, a ‘navigator’ may be needed 
to facilitate the transition process, and be responsible for the implementation of the 
management strategy. The main difference between management 
and navigation is that the former applies defined processes, 
guidelines or strategies in practice, while the latter helps develop 
new capacities within the organisation. In that case, important 
functions to process navigation include: 
• Providing clarity about roles and responsibilities in relation to risk
• Organising the ownership of systemic risks in the organisation, 
which defines responsibility, accountability and reward
• Communicating about leadership
• Working to develop trust in the people in charge
• Leveraging expertise in calling relevant external expertise, and 
ensuring that its contribution is usable by the organisation
• Overall enhancing collaboration.
Process management and navigation can come in all shapes and 
formats. Inherently, the responsibility is to build shared knowledge 
and consensus across a wide body of stakeholders (government, 
industry, academia, NGOs, the general public) in a process that is both thorough and 
deliberative. It is important to note that depending on the organisation, the process 
manager and process navigator may be the same person or different people. For large 
organisations, it may be necessary to separate the roles to ensure that the needs of both 
process management and transition navigation are met. For small organisations with 
limited resources, one person in both roles may suffice.
While each transition process must respect political, social, and institutional contexts, 
the success depends upon the capacity of the navigator to build a creative coalition that 
actively engages in the process by defining the boundaries and dynamics of the system, 
fostering opportunities for multi-actor scenario development, identifying groupthink and 
Navigation in unknown waters
“The science and art of navigation 
is holistic. The navigator must 
process an endless flow of data, 
intuitions and insights derived 
from observation and the dynamic 
rhythms and interactions of wind, 
waves, clouds, stars, sun, moon, 
the flight of birds, a bed of kelp, 
the glow of phosphorescence 
on a shallow reef – in short, the 
constantly changing world of 
weather and the sea.”  
Wade Davis 2009
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lock-ins that may act as obstacles, enabling experimentation if possible, generating 
ideas for specific management actions, and reforming the organisation or the system in a 
manner that is constructive for the various stakeholders involved.
Despite the benefits of appointing process navigators or managers, certain considerations 
must temper expectations of the capacity to reform or improve a system against systemic 
threats. Notably, such individuals do not have leadership to decide how to balance 
their organisation’s short- and long-term goals, as well as various behavioural and 
organisational tendencies that may lead an organisation to underinvest in preparing to 
deal with future systemic threats (or, more cynically, assume that such problems will occur 
only after current organisational leaders have already left their roles). These tasks remain 
with ‘captains’ or leaders. 
Box 8: Use of a process manager and process navigator in political 
campaigns and public office in the United States
Political campaigns for national office are complex affairs with substantial implications in policy 
domains such as defence, finance, public health, infrastructure, and many others. In the United 
States, newly elected politicians often rely upon transition teams, serving as process navigators, 
to help build up the capacity for the politician’s team to address all relevant policy arenas. This 
navigation occurs well before the politician even takes office. Once in office, politicians and 
their policy teams are guided by process managers to ensure continued capacity to address a 
shifting universe of policy objectives, as well as frequent changes in staffing over the tenure of 
the politician. 
Both navigation and management are different yet equally critical roles that influence the 
success of a politician to develop and implement a given policy agenda. Especially at the US 
Presidential level, transition teams ensure that national priorities are met despite a transition in 
power from one administration to the next.
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2.4  Concluding remarks
Systemic failures and extreme events are consequences of our highly interconnected 
systems. Collapses, regime shifts or other 'catastrophes' of various sizes are part of 
complex adaptive systems. They can sometimes be foreseen, but avoidance is difficult 
unless the entire system is steered into a transition to another regime. Organisations need 
to develop a better, more holistic understanding of the systems in which they operate, to 
adequately deal with the corresponding risks.
Approaches for dealing with conventional risks are not sufficient for dealing with systemic 
risks because they are often too reductionist and limited in scope to account for complex 
system interactions and challenges. As such, managing systemic risks requires a more 
comprehensive approach to hazard and impact identification, risk assessment and risk 
management (Renn, 2016, 2017b). The options for managing complex systems in a 
targeted manner (e.g., with mitigation) are limited, and interventions can have unexpected 
and uncontrollable consequences (Nauser, 2015), which may appear stochastic and 
chaotic.
Instead, organisations should seek to cooperate with others to identify options that can be 
effective in reducing systemic risks. The objective of such work is to prepare one’s system 
for a wide universe of threats in order to increase the capability of the system to recover 
from shocks, adapt or transform. Where identified as harmful or unnecessarily disruptive, 
cascade failures should ideally be stopped right at the beginning when the damage is 
still small, and the problem may not even be perceived as threatening (Helbing, 2013). 
This requires (1) appropriate monitoring measures to detect failures immediately, and (2) 
sufficient understanding of the system and its interconnections to know what to do to 
stop the cascade. As both prerequisites are difficult to achieve in practice, several authors 
recommend precautionary measures such as modularity or functional diversity to reduce 
network vulnerability to cascade spreading effects.
It is essential that policymakers, regulators and institutions become more familiar with the 
concept and better at identifying the build-up of systemic risks, which includes developing 
early-warning indicators that provide sufficient advanced warning to take cost-effective 
actions. However, even the best early-warning system will never be able to identify all 
pending catastrophic events in advance, and public and private leaders are faced with the 
challenge of preparing their respective organisations to be able to respond to unexpected 
events.
Developing resilient social and economic structures that are able to respond and rapidly 
adapt to sudden change is the best and often only way to cope with risks in complex 
systems. More efforts should be directed towards understanding how such structures 
work (Helbing, 2015). Adaptive governance strategies to deal with the consequences of 
tipping points and risk of undesirable regime shifts in a given system can be sustained by 
resilience-building strategies. However, building resilience does not come free, and there 
are trade-offs and conflicts of interest to consider.
While rigorous scientific investigations and sound academic debate are necessary 
prerequisites for improving our understanding of risks in complex systems, they alone are 
not sufficient. Findings must be translated into actionable recommendations for decision 
makers and managers in order to make a difference in practical terms. 
These guidelines intend to provide a basis to help organisations get a first grip on 
the challenges and threats posed by systemic risks in the context of transitions. The 
recommendations given here need to be broken down and translated to the individual 
context of each organisation. What works for one might not work for the other, and broad 
and impartial exploration is required to come up with a promising strategy for addressing 
systemic risks.

 CONCEPTS UNDERLYING  
THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE GUIDELINES
The IRGC guidelines for the governance of systemic risks describe key steps and 
associated methodologies for the exploration of complex adaptive systems and the 
identification and management of systemic risks. The guidelines suggest a flexible 
and adaptable process designed to address the need to govern systemic risks in the 
context of transitions requiring adaptation or transformation. They are interdisciplinary 
in nature and result from the contributions of many scholars and practitioners with 
theoretical or applied experience with systemic risks and their governance.
While the main underlying concepts remain those developed in the IRGC risk 
governance framework described in IRGC white paper number 1 (IRGC, 2005, 2017), 
and complemented by further IRGC work on emerging risks (IRGC, 2015, 2011, 
2013), additional insights from specific disciplines are needed to address the specific 
aspects of:
• Resilience for recovering from shocks while transitioning to a new state that is 
better adapted when context conditions and even the system itself has changed 
(Section 3)
• Complexity theory, systems thinking and network science applied to resilience 
(Section 4)
• Foresight to look to the future, but also ‘broadsight’ to look at current trends at 
the border or outside of the main system in which an organisation operates, and 
also detection of early-warning signs of impending regime shifts that may trigger a 
system’s collapse or a significant regime shift (Section 5).
Alltogether these sections thus provide underlying rationale for Section 2, in the form 
of supporting evidence from specific disciplines and further guidance on specific 
tools.
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3. RESILIENCE
3.1 A background on resilience 
This section was developed with contributions from 
Igor Linkov, US Army Corps of Engineers. 
Resilience is a growing field of interest relating to the 
effect that shocks and stresses have upon increasingly 
interconnected systems, such as with energy grids, 
cloud-based information systems, coastal ecosystems 
and infrastructure, and public health activities. The US 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) defines disaster 
resilience (Figure 5) as “the ability to plan and prepare 
for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse 
events” (NAS, 2012). The reference to recovery and 
adaptation in the NAS definition highlights a societal 
need to address highly uncertain and consequential 
risk events that are not easily addressed through 
traditional approaches of risk management (Trump 
et al., 2017). The Organization for Economic 
Development (OECD) uses a slightly different 
definition of resilience, which they define as “the 
ability of individuals, communities and states and their 
institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst 
positively adapting and transforming their structures 
and means for living in the face of long-term changes 
and uncertainty,” thus emphasising the possible 
need for engaging with transitions (OECD, 2014c). 
The German Academy of Sciences has adopted a 
definition where resilience refers to the capability of a 
system to maintain or quickly restore its functionality 
if faced with severe stress or disturbances (German 
Academies, 2016).
Decision-makers and policymakers have utilised the 
concept of resilience to evaluate the capability of 
various complex systems to maintain safety, security 
and flexibility, and recover from a range of potential 
adverse events. Further, resilience offers the capability 
to better review how systems may continually adjust 
to changing information, relationships, goals, threats, 
and other factors to adapt in the face of change – 
particularly those changes that could yield negative 
outcomes. Preparation for reducing the negative 
consequences of such events when they occur is 
thought to include enhancing the resilience of systems 
in desirable states, and include considerations of risk 
assessment as well as necessary resilience actions 
before, during, and after a hazardous event takes 
place. As such, resilience efforts inherently consider 
the passage of time and shifting capabilities and 
risks that may accrue due to changes in system 
performance and their capacity to absorb shocks 
(Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006). Resilience 
strategies have the potential to radically change how 
a nation prepares itself for the potential disruptions of 
key services such as its energy, water, transportation, 
healthcare, communication and financial services. 
When nations prepare for recovery from external 
shocks of a significant magnitude, resilience strategies 
must be considered (Linkov et al., 2014).
Figure 5: Illustrative representation of stages of resilience 
(adapted from “Committee on science, engineering and 
public policy”, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 2012).
This task is complicated by the limited amount 
of guidance regarding how resilience might be 
operationalised and formally reviewed. Such strategies 
are beginning to emerge in scholarly literature, 
including one example posited by Connelly et al. 
(2017). In that conceptualisation, features of resilience 
include (i) critical functions (services), (ii) thresholds, 
(iii) recovery through cross-scale (both space and 
time) interactions, (iv) memory and (v) adaptive 
management (Folke et al., 2010; Holling, 1986). 
The concept of critical functionality is important for 
prioritising protection or restoration of the front-line 
system in response to some shock or disturbance. 
Thresholds play a role in whether a system can 
absorb a shock or whether that shock will lead to 
cascading failure. Recovery time is essential for 
measuring system resilience after a disturbance 
where the threshold for system failure is not exceeded 
(Linkov, Trump & Keisler, 2018). Finally, the concept 
of memory describes the degree of self-organisation 
in the system, and adaptive management provides an 
S
ys
te
m
 fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y Critical
function
Plan / Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Time
Adaptation
is critical
to survival
Adverse event occurs
Memory
(functionality and resiliance)
Threshold
Loss of system
functionality
50 //  IRGC Guidelines for the Governance of Systemic Risks
approach for managing and learning about a system’s 
resilience opportunities and limits in a safe-to-fail 
manner.
Traditional risk analysis and resilience analysis differ, 
yet overall they must be considered complementary 
approaches to dealing with risk. One way to assess 
how they are complementary and articulated is to 
consider risk assessment as a bottom-up approach 
starting from data, and resilience as a top-down 
approach starting with mission and decision-maker 
objectives, with the obvious need for integration 
(Linkov et al., 2014). The risk assessment process 
starts with a description of the context and the 
environment with data collection, and progresses 
through modelling and subsequent characterisation 
and visualisation of risks for management. Likewise, 
resilience begins by assessing values of stakeholders 
and critical functions. For this exercise, the use of 
decision aids can incorporate stakeholders’ and 
decision-makers’ preferences and other pertinent 
information to generate valid and legitimate metrics, 
models and conclusions that ultimately inform risk 
assessments and the different actors and stakeholders 
(Merad, Dechy & Marcel, 2014).
Resilience analysis may be based on risk assessment 
or include components of risk assessment such 
as exposure and dose-response relationships. But 
it always goes beyond risk assessment. Systems 
approaches for resilience include a greater degree 
of complexity of conceptualisation, as well as a 
disconnect from individual system components. 
Moreover, less severe and better-characterised 
hazards are more easily addressed by existing 
conventional methods (IRGC, 2005).
3.2 Lenses of resilience:  
a corporate perspective
While resilience is described in the literature as a 
concept and the property of a system with certain 
dynamic attributes, the formal operationalisation, 
assessment, and measurement of resilience is always 
difficult to determine before a sudden shock occurs. It 
is the behaviour of the system that demonstrates, after 
the shock, if the system was resilient. Bresch et al. 
(2014) have attempted to recognise from experience in 
a variety of companies which common factors enable 
the design of resilience solutions in the corporate 
sector. They begin by acknowledging that, since many 
kinds of stresses and disruptions may negatively affect 
companies, a systemic approach is needed to strive 
for resilience. 
The company is a system, and resilient companies 
need to widen their horizon to embrace factors that 
they do not control (Kupers, 2014). Companies that 
build their long-term adaptive capacity are better 
prepared to absorb disruptions, acknowledge 
interconnectedness and proactively change to 
navigate transitions, adapt, and transform. The 
main goal of enterprise resilience is to improve the 
adaptability of a company. This goal differs from the 
goal of building robustness (or ‘hardness’). Concretely, 
the authors recommend building three types of 
resilience:
• Structural (or engineering) resilience focuses 
on the systemic nature of a company, to improve 
business continuity with redundancy, modularity 
and diversity. The creation of buffering capacity that 
can absorb shocks is an important aspect, as is the 
decentralisation of important assets or processes 
and the creation or development of diversity. 
Structural resilience enables a system to endure 
greater stress and recover more quickly. It increases 
resistance to disruption, although this may be at the 
cost of efficiency. But it does not go further; it does 
not help a company to adapt to new underlying 
context conditions.
• Integrative resilience focuses on the complex 
interconnections of a company and its environment 
and mutual dependencies with others. It implies 
better understanding and having pro-active 
actions upon interactions between different scales, 
identifying important thresholds that can be tipping 
points before disruptions, and strengthening of 
trust and social capital. These features are typical of 
complex adaptive systems, which require systems 
thinking for their governance. This type of resilience 
improves the capacity of the company to change 
towards a complex adaptive system but here, again, 
it may be at the cost of efficiency (see Section 3.4). 
Also, if the changes are too big, the company has 
to undergo a transformation process, which the 
development of integrative resilience is not meant to 
facilitate.
• Transformative resilience requires systems to 
review changes over extended time horizons. This is 
necessary to enhance the capability of a company 
to transform itself if the fundamental conditions of 
its survival have changed. Such change can take 
many shapes, such as the need to reduce exposure 
to systemic risk via reduced interconnectivity and 
feedback loops with other systems, or the creation 
of redundancies and reserve capacities to quickly 
address such shocks as they arise. For more about 
transformative resilience, see Section 4.4.
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3.3 Lenses of resilience: a social-
ecological systems perspective 
This section is based on a written contribution made 
by Allyson Quinlan, Resilience Alliance, at the October 
2017 workshop.
Resilience thinking has emerged as a key concept for 
addressing many of today’s most pressing challenges 
that stem from an increasingly interconnected and 
rapidly changing world. What began with the discovery 
that ecosystems have multiple alternative states and 
that a system’s resilience determines how readily it 
will shift between them, has evolved to emphasise the 
role of complexity within social-ecological systems 
(Folke et al., 2016). A large network of interdisciplinary 
scholars, such as with the Resilience Alliance 3, has 
advanced our understanding of the dynamic nature of 
human-environment relationships as complex adaptive 
systems. 
Over the past two decades, research exploring 
concepts such as thresholds, adaptive cycles of 
change and cross-scale interactions, has led to many 
insights for coping with rapid change and navigating 
the Anthropocene. Consistent with this perspective, 
resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and reorganise, while keeping essentially 
the same function, structure, and system feedbacks 
(Folke et al., 2010; Walker, Holling, Carpenter & Kinzig, 
2004). Furthermore, a resilient social-ecological 
system can learn and self-organise in dynamic 
environments (Folke et al., 2016).
Social-ecological systems emphasise how people 
depend upon, shape, and respond to the environment 
(Folke et al., 2016). How these types of complex 
adaptive systems behave, however, is rarely simple, 
linear or predictable. Whether it is a rural village, 
a rapidly growing city, coastal fishery or dryland 
ecosystem, these and other types of systems consist 
of people interacting with their environment across 
multiple levels in a variety of socio-economic, cultural 
and environmental contexts. A resilience approach 
embraces this complexity and accepts that there will 
always be some uncertainty.
Resilience principles
A set of seven policy-relevant and theoretically 
grounded principles for building resilience in social-
ecological systems contributes to the practical 
application of resilience thinking and can be applied to 
a wide variety of different contexts (Biggs et al., 2012): 
• Maintain diversity and redundancy
• Manage connectivity
• Manage slow variables and feedbacks
• Foster complex adaptive systems thinking
• Encourage learning
• Encourage participation
• Promote polycentric governance.
Resilience in practice
Applying a resilience lens in practice involves new 
ways of thinking about systems and also finding 
new ways to influence how a system develops and 
evolves. Resilience assessment aims to understand 
the capacity of the system to adapt or transform 
as needed, in response to both gradual and abrupt 
change (Folke et al., 2016). Originally conceived over 
a decade ago, resilience assessment is a structured 
learning process designed to engage a variety of 
stakeholders and deepen their understanding of a 
system’s dynamics (Resilience Alliance, 2010). It 
involves describing how key social and ecological 
components interact, the role of historical legacies and 
how a system is influenced by what is happening at 
scales above and below. Particular attention is placed 
on external drivers and internal feedbacks, important 
cross-scale interactions, and potential thresholds or 
tipping points. Using a multi-method approach, the 
assessment helps build a shared understanding of 
how a system works and the processes that build, 
erode, or maintain its resilience over time (Quinlan et 
al.,2015). 
Despite a structured approach, resilience assessment 
does not anticipate predictable outcomes. Rather, the 
process is one of on-going learning and adaptation. 
Designed to follow a general framework that 
encourages iteration and reflexivity, an assessment 
guide should not be mistaken for a blueprint. The 
behaviour of complex systems emerges from different 
groups of actors interacting and responding to new 
challenges and opportunities along the way. What 
successful outcomes share in common are novel 
insights that inform innovative strategies for managing 
social-ecological systems.
3.4 Trade-off between resilience 
and efficiency
Decentralising decisions, enabling self-organisation 
and social networking, and promoting diversity are 
examples of approaches that promote resilience 
development (OECD, 2014b; OECD, 2014a; OECD, 
2011).3 The Resilience Alliance was established in 1999 and is supported by 
an international network of members from universities, government, 
and non-government agencies, and publishes the journal Ecology 
and Society.
52 //  IRGC Guidelines for the Governance of Systemic Risks
On the other hand, organisations must be efficient. 
Efficiency implies the provision of satisfactory 
performance at a reasonable cost. For organisations to 
become more cost-efficient, they may reorganise work, 
realign priorities, and innovate their operating practices.
Increasing efficiency may be at odds with components 
of resilience such as redundancy and loose-coupling 
between elements of a network. But there are ways 
to resolve the trade-off, as exemplified by the way 
Box 9: Example of Walmart supply chain post-Hurricane Katrina 
The response to Hurricane Katrina, which hit the Gulf of Mexico and the city of New Orleans in 2005, is as an example of 
organisational failure to anticipate and react to a major disruptive event. However, Hurricane Katrina also revealed some 
successful strategies based on improving resilience to cope with unforeseen events. Walmart stores were able to provide 
food and water to the most impacted areas of New Orleans much faster than the US Federal Emergency Management 
Authority (FEMA). In the three weeks following Katrina’s landfall, Walmart shipped 2500 truckloads of merchandise and 
made additional drivers and trucks available for community members and organisations wishing to help (Horwitz, 2009). 
The resilience of the logistics chain put in place by Walmart can be explained by the following factors:
• Flexibility – A dedicated business continuity unit, staffed by six to ten employees, was already routinely operating in 
2005. In case of major events, the team was expandable to 60 people, including senior representatives from each of the 
company’s functional areas.
• Reliance on various sources of information (diversity) – The company used its hurricane tracking software and had 
contracts with private forecasters to obtain reliable and updated information promptly. 
• Decentralisation – Walmart’s senior management gave district and store managers enough discretion to make decisions 
based on local information and immediate needs without requiring pre-approval. For example, a store manager who 
was no longer able to get in contact with his superiors decided to run a bulldozer through the ruined store to recover all 
products that had not been damaged by the water, and made them available for residents. Local decision-makers were 
praised by senior management for their initiatives after the crisis.
• Protocols and preparation – Protocols to deal with major disruptive events were already in place, allowing the 
organisation to adapt decision-making strategies based on the type and severity of threat experienced. For instance, the 
number of personnel who were part of the command centre was gradually augmented as the risk increased. Two days 
before landfall, 50 staff members had joined the team. 
• Contingency planning – As uncertainties regarding the areas that would be heavily damaged became more tractable, the 
decision was made to move emergency supplies such as generators from the current warehouse location to “designated 
staging areas so that the stores would be able to open quickly” (Zimmerman & Bauerlein, 2005). Those staging areas were 
set up outside the areas most likely to be hit the worst, to facilitate quick response with minimal danger (Horwitz, 2009).
The benefit Walmart derived from this kind of preparation obviously goes beyond what could be quantified in monetary 
terms. It had a positive impact on local communities and greater society, which resulted in reputational benefits for 
Walmart (IRGC, 2015).
Box 10: Example from the food trade sector 
The complexity and size of international trade in agricultural and food products enable the provision of food to the world 
population, despite large imbalances among countries that are net importers and countries that are net exporters. The 
food supply chain is heterogeneous, which is a component of resilience. However, a study supported by various sources 
indicates that only seven countries form the core of the network, providing more than 77% of international trading. 
Vulnerability is particularly high concerning the distribution of potential contaminants, because of the difficulty in tracing 
their origin. In case of large food poisoning outbreaks, such as the E-coli outbreak that hit Germany in 2011, it is very 
complex to identify the source of the contamination (Ercsey-Ravasz, Toroczkai, Lakner & Baranyi, 2012).
Walmart’s supply chain logistics, organised to 
maximise efficiency, were resilient to disruptions 
caused by Hurricane Katrina (see Box 9 below). The 
trade-off between a system’s resilience and efficiency 
is thoroughly discussed in literature, such as with flood 
risk management (Hegger, Driessen & Bakker, 2018), 
transportation networks (Ganin et al., 2017), or energy 
systems (Cholda & Jaglarz, 2015).
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4. SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESILIENCE 
THROUGH THE LENSES OF 
COMPLEXITY THEORY, SYSTEMS 
THINKING AND NETWORK SCIENCE
4.1 Complexity theory 
Complexity theory is grounded in an attempt to 
explain how systems in various physical, social or 
virtual environments respond to stimuli and change 
over time. Within complexity theory, systems are 
constantly undergoing a state of change. This change 
is driven by a combination of (a) interaction with 
other external systems or change at the boundaries 
of a given system, and (b) feedback loops which 
operate due to interconnectivity within and between 
systems. In essence, complexity theory allows us to 
explain, beyond linear models, how a given system 
is challenged and affected by ongoing entropy and 
instability - conditions that result in the emergence of 
varying patterns and structures as the system evolves 
and organises itself into something new (Lowell, 2016).
Most complexity theory scholars would contend 
that because systems are in a constant state of 
change, attempting to remain unchanged over the 
long term becomes increasingly difficult due to the 
impossibility to control change within and between 
systems in question (Helbing, 2015). Complexity 
theorists emphasise the role of transitions in the 
process of managing systemic risks. Rather than 
resisting change, stakeholders should instead identify 
opportunities to adjust their system’s parameters, 
operating principles, or input requirements in a way 
that is beneficial to all that depend upon it. In some 
cases, it may also be preferable to self-organise 
(Brock, Carpenter & Scheffer, 2008). However, 
based on ecological studies, many systems theories 
make a distinction between equilibrium conditions 
that are fairly stable and robust against changes, 
adaptive equilibria that allow changes within specific 
boundaries, and systems in transition or turbulence 
that have left a previous state of equilibrium and 
re-arrange themselves to form a new equilibrium (or 
remain in a chaotic phase).
A benefit of complexity theory is that it forces one 
to adopt a systems-view of how disruptions can 
percolate well beyond the point of origin of a given 
disruption. Examples include the failure of Lehman 
Brothers INC, which triggered a massive recession 
in the European Union, or the late 2006 food 
commodities and energy speculation that triggered a 
parabolic rise in fuel prices and contributed to mass-
starvation in East Africa (Livingstone, 2012; Clapp, 
2014; Haldane & May, 2011). For the former, the 
financial failure of Lehman Brothers due to their large 
stake in subprime and other lower-rated mortgage 
tranches triggered a ‘contagion effect,’ whereby firms 
directly connected with Lehman Brothers suffered 
substantial losses (Luyendijk, 2015). Furthermore, 
even those firms and companies indirectly connected 
to Lehman Brothers suffered from economic panic, 
a falling stock market, and a lack of liquid assets to 
cover losses as detailed in the United States Senate’s 
Levin-Coburn Report (Levin & Coburn, 2011). For 
the latter, speculation in fuel and food prices caused 
sudden spikes in cost (wheat by 80%, maize by 90%, 
and rice by 320%) that placed 200 million global poor 
at risk of mass starvation – particularly in East Africa. 
Within complexity theory, a disruption to a system is 
not only a challenge for that given system, but can 
also have much larger implications over time.
Complexity theory inherently works well with 
resilience. It provides resilience analysts with 
a philosophical underpinning regarding (i) the 
ability of feedback loops and nested relationships 
between systems to generate cascading systemic 
consequences from a single shock, and (ii) the 
need to understand how individual sub-systems 
contribute to the larger operation of a system in 
ideal circumstances. Through such a systems-view 
that acknowledges the tenets of complexity theory, 
resilience analysts can identify interaction effects that 
could foster cascading failures across a larger system 
due to a shock or stress and identify leverage points, 
i.e., places in systems where small interventions 
can desirably influence the broader system (see 
Section 4.4.
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4.2 Systems thinking
Given an understanding of complexity theory, 
Westley et al. (2002) argue that all activities and 
actors, ranging from individual humans to large and 
complex ecological biomes, are both participants 
in a larger web of systems as well as comprised of 
smaller sub-systems. Historically, these systems 
can be environmental (i.e., various ecological and 
climatological activities within a given biome), 
social (i.e., the interaction and cultural traditions of 
various people in a given location), economic (i.e., 
the exchange of goods and services, inclusive of the 
supply chains needed to produce and refine goods 
into products (Weetman, 2016)), and various others. 
This idea, known as ‘systems thinking’ helps consider 
the interconnectivity and feedback loops within and 
between systems, thereby allowing one to identify 
how disruptions to one system can have indirect yet 
significant consequences upon others (Fleischman et 
al., 2010).
Systems thinking is an inherent assumption within 
complexity theory (Ostrom & Janssen, 2004). 
Methodologically, systems thinking comprises two 
key exercises, including (a) an inwards review of the 
various operations and components within one’s 
system to better understand how a given system 
functions normally, and (b) an outwards review of how 
one’s system fits within a broader web of interactions 
with others, and thereby affects/is affected by such 
external systems (Pisano, 2012; Holling, 1986; Walker 
& Salt, 2012). The ultimate goal of a systems thinking 
approach is to determine where a system might be 
vulnerable to disruption based upon shocks within and 
without one’s system – effectively applying principles 
of complexity theory to understand the conditions by 
which a system may encounter disruption that hinders 
its operations.
Collectively, systems thinking and complexity theory 
operationalise resilience as an approach where (a) we 
seek solutions to preserve beneficial systems against 
shock and bolster their recovery from disruption, or 
(b) we seek to transition a system in a manner that 
protects it from systemic risks and moves towards 
a more ideal or beneficial state (Anderies, Folke, 
Walker & Ostrom, 2013; Gunderson & Folke, 2011; 
Helbing, 2010; Renn, 2016, 2017b). Palma-Oliveira & 
Trump (2016) indicate that a system-centric approach 
alongside an understanding of complexity (i.e., the 
potential for cascading effects to trigger multi-system 
disturbance based upon system interconnectivity) 
is essential to move beyond using resilience as a 
metaphor for ‘bouncing back.’ 
Instead, a systems and complexity-driven approach 
allows resilience analysts to understand the 
constant state of change and fluid interaction effects 
between systems and their relevant sub-systems. 
Fundamentally, systems thinking and complexity 
theory allow resilience scholars and analysts to 
address considerations of panarchy, where a system 
can not only move through different phases but where 
a change in one sub-system can have a cascading 
effect that alters all others (Gunderson, 2001; Holling, 
2001). These interaction effects help determine where 
a system’s brittleness may make it prone to failure and 
collapse, thereby indicating that certain interventions 
are needed at specific junctures within a system 
should it be deemed necessary to preserve it against 
future systemic threats (Palma-Oliveira & Trump, 
2016).
4.3 Network science
Network science serves as one promising 
methodological option to illustrate, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, the complex interconnectivity 
inherent within many systems. Defined by the National 
Research Council (2005) as “the study of network 
representations of physical, biological, and social 
phenomena leading to predictive models of these 
phenomena,” network science seeks to visually and 
mathematically represent interconnected systems 
and their strength of attraction. In a network science 
approach, it is possible to visualise and model how a 
shock to a system percolates across the network to 
various connected nodes (other systems) over time. 
An advantage to such a network science approach 
is that it can be applied to various application areas 
(social, economic, infrastructural, etc.), and can 
account for the constantly changing nature of a 
system to absorb incoming disruptions and adapt 
to change. For example, Ganin et al. (2017) used 
network science to model transportation systems, 
where transportation systems experience traffic when 
a vehicle build-up or blockage to certain portions of 
the transportation grid cascades into broader traffic 
across the entire system. Network science is also 
being used to assess how and when collaborative 
governance can lead to better management of 
systemic risks. Bodin (2017), for instance, conducted 
a study on collaborative networks to identify which 
actors collaborate, and how the system in which they 
are embedded influences governance outcomes. 
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4.4 Intervening to trigger change 
in complex systems
Transformative resilience (see Section 3.2) requires 
several inputs to responsibly and thoroughly 
address systemic risks. These include (a) distributed 
governance, (b) foresight and anticipatory measures, 
and (c) innovation and experimentation. Collectively, 
these factors support strategies to anticipate and 
respond proactively to changes in the systems in 
which a company or an organisation is embedded 
with dynamic reorganisation, restructuration, and 
reinvention (Bresch et al., 2014).
Distributed governance is where management 
is undertaken from multiple centres of authority, 
with trust and effective communication between 
stakeholders and the capacity to develop and use 
measures of anticipating systemic risks (Bresch et 
al., 2014; Klinke, 2017; Palma-Oliveira et al., 2018). 
Mechanistically, such distributed governance can take 
multiple forms, yet usually integrates data reporting, 
analysis, and decision-making within a given sector 
across key stakeholders in government, industry, 
academia, and civil society. Such multi-stakeholder 
efforts require both a measure of coordination to 
align incentives across all players, as well as to 
empower the group to make changes to a system at 
risk of, currently experiencing, or in the aftermath of 
systemic risk (Klinke & Renn, 2012). A key motivation 
behind such an inclusive governance structure is the 
diversity of perspectives raised by the many different 
actors in a decision-making group to better address 
uncertainty (Polasky, Carpenter, Folke & Keeler, 2011). 
Such distributed governance is further benefitted by 
exercises of foresight and experimentation.
Foresight refers to the capacity of individuals 
and organisations to engage with uncertainty and 
anticipate the potential outcomes and the future 
state of the system (discussed further in Section 5). 
Such uncertainty can arise through an incomplete 
knowledge of systemic structure and behaviour, 
as well as through the wide and uncertain universe 
of threats that may disrupt a system at any given 
moment in time. By their nature, systemic risks include 
a multitude of connected parts that could trigger 
cascading failures upon disruption from a variety of 
threats – making it impossible to accurately predict 
the characteristics or consequences that disruption 
may have upon one’s system (Berkes, 2007). Foresight 
is an effort undertaken by various stakeholders to 
both understand emerging trends regarding systemic 
behaviour and potential for disruption, as well as 
futuristic threats that may arise to disrupt a system 
in the years to come (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013). For 
example, the US Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
regularly conducts foresight exercises to identify 
limited yet emerging viruses to determine likely future 
outbreaks and prioritise treatments and vaccines 
(CDC, 2013). Likewise, the Future of Life Institute 
explores futuristic systemic risks posed by artificial 
intelligence and seeks to identify strategies to pre-
emptively reduce economic, social, and environmental 
harms that the technology may incur (Hawking, 
Russell, Tegmark & Wilczek, 2014). Such foresight 
exercises can comprise quantitative modelling 
efforts to more qualitative ‘thought pieces,’ whereby 
individuals and organisations try to get a better sense 
of how a system may be challenged in the future, and 
how it might be shaped and transitioned into a more 
favourable state to avoid negative consequences.
A critical element of robust foresight includes 
innovation and experimentation (Bresch et al., 
2014). Innovation involves efforts to identify new 
strategies of system formation and operation, 
while experimentation reviews the efficacy of such 
innovative proposals through modelling or small-scale 
implementation. On the one hand, modelling exercises 
provide the ability to simulate how a system behaves 
under stress, and how transitions to a system can 
allow it to perform more optimally in response to such 
systemic risks in the future. Among many others, 
such exercises may include Monte Carlo simulations 
(Mooney, 1997) and network science. On the other 
hand, experimentation allows stakeholders to test 
how a system operates in real-world conditions, 
albeit under a controlled or smaller scale than would 
be derived in large interconnected networks. For 
example, policy experimentation within the US federal 
system allows federal governments to monitor the 
strengths and weaknesses of policies implemented 
within individual states – such as with pre-Affordable 
Care Act healthcare exchanges in Massachusetts 
or more rigorous environmental protection in New 
York and Michigan (Bednar, 2011). The strong benefit 
of experimentation includes the opportunity to 
analytically review system performance under stress 
of systemic threats, whereby those policy proposals 
that perform well are given evidence to support their 
implementation upon a larger, national scale.
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4.5  Leverage points for intervention 
within a system
After understanding the importance of how systemic 
risks manifest and transitions in complex and ever-
changing interconnected systems, as well as how 
such transitions may come about, a further point of 
consideration includes how to intervene in a system’s 
given operations (Haas et al., 2015). Donella Meadows 
(1999) described these moments as ‘leverage points,’ 
which are areas within a system where changes in 
its organisational structure or activity are particularly 
effective at generating favourable organisational 
transitions. Leverage points serve as opportunities 
where changes to one part of a system can percolate 
across other connected nodes – inherently using the 
interconnectivity of a system to generate positive 
cascading changes to resolve an inherent weakness in 
the structure or operations of a system.
Meadows argues that such interventions can be 
implemented in 12 ways (in ascending order of 
effectiveness based upon her perception of each 
windows’ respective capacity to induce widespread 
system transition to a different state):
12. The power to transcend paradigms
11. The mindset or paradigm out of which the system arises (its goals, structure,  
rules, delays, parameters) 
10. The goals of the system
9. The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organise system structure
8. The rules of the system (such as incentives, punishments, constraints)
7. The structure of information flows (who does and does not have access to information)
6. The gain around driving positive feedback loops
5. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying to correct against
4. The lengths of delays, relative to the rate of system change
3. The structure of material stocks and flows (such as transport networks, population age structures)
2. The sizes of buffers and other stabilising stocks, relative to their flows
1. Constants, parameters, numbers (such as subsidies, taxes, standards)
Meadows cautions that this list can change based 
upon the context of a given system, whereby the 
order of these leverage points may change. Further, 
she argues that the further down the list one attempts 
to use as an intervention point, the greater systemic 
resistance is likely to arise, and more effort is needed 
to induce a change in the system. For example, a 
system’s parameters for operation are relatively simple 
to change – mechanisms are readily available to 
impose a tax that disincentivises a certain behaviour. 
Likewise, it is quite difficult to alter the core mission 
statement and goals of a longstanding system due to 
the cultural norms and traditions that have preserved 
and reinforced it up until that point. However, the 
development of ‘windows of opportunity,’ which 
usually open following crises or in the event of 
disruptive innovations, can present rare chances to 
utilise more resistant system elements (i.e., paradigms, 
goals, or root structure of the system).
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5. FORESIGHT, ‘BROADSIGHT’ AND 
EARLY-WARNING SYSTEMS
In order to deal with high levels of uncertainty and 
explore possible future developments of complex 
systems, it is necessary to go beyond conventional 
forecasting approaches that rely mainly on past 
data to predict the future (Anderson, 1997), or that 
elicit and calibrate expert judgments in the event 
of data paucity. Foresight and ‘broadsight’ are 
needed to ensure advanced risk identification (and 
help elucidate opportunities for intervention, and 
identify leverage points and windows of opportunity 
as discussed in Section 4.5). While foresight is the 
construction of informed representations of possible 
futures, including the identification of future risks and 
opportunities, through a dialogue process among 
different stakeholders and combination of various 
types of knowledge to support decision-making, IRGC 
uses the term ‘broadsight’ to extend the scope of the 
analysis beyond the boundaries of the organisation or 
system under consideration to ensure broad-based 
risk assessment by incorporating global megatrends 
and interdependencies between systems. A range 
of options is available for successful foresight and 
broadsight analysis. These include horizon scanning 
and scenario development, which may be selectively 
or jointly pursued in line with the objective, the time 
horizon under consideration, and system scale (Healey 
& Hodgkinson, 2008). 
Horizon scanning
The first approach that many organisations pursue, 
in one way or another, is ‘horizon scanning.’ Horizon 
scanning is primarily about detecting, collecting, 
and interpreting weak signals that may indicate 
shifts in existing trends or situations. It is defined 
as a systematic process of strategic learning about 
organisations’ circumstances (Spies, 1991) with 
the aim of identifying new developments that can 
challenge past assumptions or provide a new 
perspective on future threats and opportunities 
(Gordon & Glenn, 1994). Horizon scanning activities 
can be fully exploratory or issue centred (Amanatidou 
et al., 2012). Horizon scanning is used by enterprises 
and recommended by organisations such as the 
OECD. It can be defined as a technique for detecting 
early signs of potentially important developments, 
which requires a systematic examination of potential 
threats and opportunities. To be effective, horizon 
scanning must explore new, emerging and possible 
issues as well as persistent challenges and trends. The 
process must be open to creative thinking and able to 
detect signals at the margins of conventional thinking 
that may challenge current assumptions. 
Horizon scanning is particularly suited for identifying 
elements of systemic risks for two key reasons. 
First, horizon scanning combines information on 
emerging trends in social, economic, political, 
technological and environmental domains, where 
such multidisciplinary insights are required to identify 
systemic risks. Second, horizon scanning takes a 
long-term perspective, which can reduce the chances 
of oversight when risks are emerging or slow moving. 
Horizon scanning may lead to information overload. 
As the set of threats and opportunities identified can 
exceed the organisation’s capacity for further analysis, 
a filtering process is required. The filtering exercise can 
be performed according to qualitative and quantitative 
criteria such as exposure and vulnerability of the 
organisation, possible impact and consequences for 
the organisation’s business, core values or system, 
the estimated likelihood of a threat to materialise, and 
available lead-time before the threat or opportunity 
could become a reality (IRGC, 2015). 
Scenario development
To effectively identify and address systemic risks, 
scenarios about alternative futures for complex 
systems can be constructed to evoke queries and 
conversations regarding the future state of a system, 
as well as interlinked systems (van Notten, 2006). It is 
recommended to choose scenario approaches that 
help deal with the uncertain development of systemic 
risks and possibility of regime shifts. This requirement 
renders obsolete those forecast-based scenarios 
that extrapolate past trends into the future and at 
most account for some policy parameters, making 
them only relevant for short-term decision-making. 
Although scientific methods for scenario development 
exist, they are often limited when it comes to dealing 
with risks that arise in complex systems and that are 
highly uncertain and often unpredictable (Cornelissen, 
2006; Tourki, Keisler & Linkov, 2013; Weick, 1989). 
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Wilkinson, Kupers and Mangalagiu (2013) propose 
the use of plausibility-based scenarios for complex 
systems. Plausibility-based scenarios expand the 
scope of exploratory scenarios by emphasising the 
need to engage heterogeneous agents iteratively. 
Science-fiction prototyping also helps in this regard 
(Merrie, Keys, Metian & Österblom, 2017). For more 
information on successful scenario development for 
systemic risks, see Section 3.4. 
Since horizon scanning and scenario development 
are not specific to systemic risks, the following tools 
can be useful for improving the odds of anticipating 
risks that arise in complex and highly uncertain 
environments:
• Identifying the drivers of new or emerging risks, 
which causes risks to emerge, be amplified or 
be attenuated (see 'Contributing factors to risk 
emergence', Section 5.1).
• Complementing weak-signals from horizon 
scanning techniques with statistical early-signals 
(see 'Usefulness of early-warning systems' in 
Section 5.2).
• Developing and using quantitative modelling 
techniques for systemic risk assessment and 
informing decision-making (see 'Developing 
and using quantitative modelling techniques', 
Section 5.3).
• Engaging in participatory scenario development and 
visioning (see 'Scenario development for systemic 
risks', Section 5.4).
5.1. Contributing factors to risk emergence 
IRGC's work on emerging risks, whether individual 
or systemic, has emphasised the role of 'contributing 
factors to risk emergence.' Horizon scanning for 
early identification of potential risks or imbalances in 
systems is complemented by tracking the existence of 
contributing factors to risk emergence as described by 
IRGC (2010) (see Box 11). Understanding these factors 
enables more accurate understanding of the changes 
to the system in which an organisation operates.
At the management level, it may be possible to take 
action based on the factors that are controllable. 
However, any action may have cascading 
consequences in the system and other connected 
systems, and it is important to integrate feedback 
from one’s own and others’ actions into anticipated 
outcomes. See also Option 1 for managing emerging 
risks in IRGC's guidelines for emerging risk 
governance (IRGC, 2015, p. 29).
5.2 Usefulness of early-warning systems
The question that interests most people involved 
in the assessment and management of systemic 
risks is whether it is possible to act on early-warning 
signals to deal with systemic risks. The answer to 
this question also depends significantly upon the 
nature and robustness of the early-warning signals, 
and the strategy chosen to combat systemic risks, 
particularly whether to (a) support and strengthen the 
ability of the system to self-organise and self-control, 
(b) undertake pro-active intervention in the form of 
prevention, mitigation, adaptation and transformation 
(c) prepare for disruptions, accidents and crises 
(absorb and recover from shocks) (see Section 2.2, 
Step 4). Some of these strategic choices may be 
specific to organisations given the system scope they 
are interested in, thereby influencing the type of early 
warning systems (EWS) they put in place.
EWS are likely to be tailored to industry and civil 
society. One example includes the use of social media 
monitoring systems, where companies can acquire 
real-time feedback regarding product opportunities, 
risks, and other information pertinent to their business 
operations. For example, Greenpeace campaigned on 
social media against the use of palm oil in 2016-2017 
within Nestlé’s Kit Kat bars. Nestlé quickly formed 
a social media monitoring service via their ‘digital 
acceleration teams’ (Nestlé’s EWS) that acquired 
information of a social response to Greenpeace’s 
campaign and sent signals to Nestlé management 
regarding ongoing trends of the protest. Though 
the effort is still underway, Nestlé used available 
information to transition its supply chain operations 
away from palm oil, which contributed to deforestation 
(Fitzgerald, 2013). Further, Nestlé has used their digital 
acceleration teams to review social media feedback on 
their general operations of 2,000 total brands, allowing 
Nestlé to transition operations and even advertising 
on a given brand based upon real-time consumer 
feedback (Fitzgerald, 2013).
Large public and private organisations routinely 
use EWS tools to provide a warning for impending 
undesirable regime shifts. Public agencies make use of 
early warning systems to predict near-future ecological 
hazards, such as floods, tornados, blizzards, and other 
severe weather events (Carsell, Pingel & Ford, 2004). 
These systems provide signals to decision-makers 
regarding the institutional steps that need to be taken 
to (a) protect a system against shock, or (b) transition 
various components of the system in a manner 
where it mitigates, avoids or prevents the shock from 
occurring (Scheffer et al., 2009). For certain events 
like floods, mudslides, or avalanches, EWS can 
signal near-future concerns that can be partially or 
entirely addressed through infrastructural, social, and 
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Box 11: IRGC contributing factors to risk emergence
Factor 1: Scientific unknowns
Scientific unknowns, whether tractable or intractable, 
contribute to risks being unanticipated, unnoticed and 
over- or underestimated.
Factor 2: Loss of safety margins
The level of connectivity in many of today’s social and 
technical systems is greater than in the past, and the 
interconnections are increasing. The pace at which these 
systems operate is becoming faster, and many of them 
are operating under high levels of stress. This can lead to 
tight coupling of components within systems and a loss of 
safety margins.
Factor 3: Positive feedback
Systems exhibiting positive feedback react by amplifying 
a change or perturbation that affects them. Positive 
feedback tends to be destabilising and can thus amplify 
the likelihood or consequences of an emerging risk (ER).
Factor 4: Varying susceptibilities to risks
The consequences of an ER may be different from one 
population to another. Geography, genetics, experience 
and wealth are just some of the possible contextual 
differences that create varying susceptibilities to risks.
Factor 5: Conflicts of interest, values and science
Public debates about ERs seldom show a clear separation 
between science, values and interests at play. This results 
in conflicts, which create fertile ground for risks to emerge 
or amplify.
Factor 6: Social dynamics
Social change can lead to social harm. In other 
circumstances, it can attenuate potential harm. It is 
therefore important for risk managers to identify, analyse 
and understand changing social dynamics.
Factor 7: Technological Advances
Risk may emerge when technological change is not 
accompanied by appropriate prior scientific investigations 
or post-release surveillance of the resulting health, 
economic, ecological and societal impacts. Risks are 
further exacerbated when economic, policy or regulatory 
frameworks are insufficient. Technological innovation may 
be unduly delayed if such frameworks are overly stringent.
Factor 8: Temporal complications
A risk may emerge or be amplified if its time course makes 
detection difficult or if the time course does not align with 
the time horizons of concern to analysts, managers and 
policymakers.
Factor 9: Communication
Risks may be complicated or amplified by untimely, 
incomplete, misleading or absent communication. Effective 
communication that is open and frank can help to build 
trust. In many cases, such communication can attenuate 
or lead to better anticipation and management of emerging 
risk (ER).
Factor 10: Information asymmetries
Information asymmetries occur when some stakeholders 
hold back key information about a risk that is not available 
to others. These asymmetries may be created intentionally 
or accidentally. In some cases, the maintenance of 
asymmetries can reduce risks, but in other cases, it can be 
the source of risk or amplify a risk by creating mistrust and 
fostering non-cooperative behaviour.
Factor 11: Perverse incentives
Perverse incentives are those that induce 
counterproductive or undesirable behaviour which leads to 
negative, unintended consequences. Such incentives may 
lead to the emergence of risks, either by fostering overly 
risk-prone behaviours or by discouraging risk prevention 
efforts.
Factor 12: Malicious motives and acts
Malicious motives give rise to ERs and therefore, 
practitioners need to consider intentional as well as 
unintentional causes of risks. Malicious motives and 
acts are not new, but in a globalised world with highly 
interconnected infrastructures, their effects can have a 
much broader impact.
Source: IRGC 2010
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environmental system transition. Likewise, EWS for 
hurricanes can provide governments and the public 
with valuable time to prepare to absorb the upcoming 
shocks of storms that could completely disrupt various 
social, economic, and infrastructural systems (Adger, 
Hughes, Folke, Carpenter & Rockström, 2005).
However, it is often difficult to determine which signals 
contain important information regarding impending 
systemic risks or threats. Interpreting such signals 
against other background noise can amplify or 
dampen the signal’s indication of impending systemic 
threat, leading an organisation to chase red herrings or 
ignore key pieces of evidence regarding such threats 
in the near future. Though it is difficult to pre-emptively 
address this challenge, the triangulation of signals (in 
other words, identifying signals with similar messages 
or meanings) can help verify, confirm, or deny potential 
concerns.
Another limitation is that a critical point of emphasis 
behind the efficacy of EWS to help prevent undesirable 
regime shift is a willingness of policymakers and 
relevant stakeholders to take active steps to transition 
their system in a more sustainable and favourable 
manner. For example, Cape Town, South Africa 
was described in January 2018 as the first major 
international city to run out of water (Murphy, 2018). 
Despite years of warnings that such an event could 
happen, and months of observable data regarding 
the reduction in freshwater supply leading up to the 
crisis, few formal actions were taken to transition Cape 
Town’s water use systems onto a more sustainable 
trajectory. More alarming are the water consumption 
trends of locals, which have not substantially reduced 
in response to the crisis (Murphy, 2018). The Cape 
Town Mayor’s Office acknowledged this lack of 
voluntary transition in a January 2018 statement, 
arguing that “It is quite unbelievable that a majority of 
people do not seem to care and are sending all of us 
headlong towards Day Zero [when Cape Town has run 
out of water]”. This ongoing case is a clear example of 
a lack of willingness to transition a system into a more 
favourable state despite the availability of multiple 
signals that call for such a transition before the crisis 
becomes unavoidable and even more damaging.
Such EWS limitations are amplified for systemic risks 
that are believed to be far remote in the future. A 
popular example of this includes the effects of climate 
change, which are typically slow-moving (making it 
difficult for many to observe environmental changes 
from one year to the next), with many destructive and 
possibly catastrophic system shocks suggested to 
arise decades from now (Stenseth et al., 2002). This 
presents two key problems, including (a) psychosocial 
responses that encourage procrastination as well 
as a belief that future generations will solve the 
problem, and (b) that signals from current EWS may 
be incorrect or misinterpreted due to various proposed 
confounding factors that challenge causality of an 
EWS signal as predicting future climate troubles 
(Dunlap, 2013). As such, even with dozens of repeated 
signals regarding the need to transition a system to 
be more sustainable to future climate change, various 
psychosocial, political, cultural, and economic factors 
can cause governments and publics to dismiss 
warnings posed by climate change EWS.
Statistical Early-Warning Signals 
This section is based on A. Nursimulu (2015a).
As seen in Section 2.2 (Step 1), statistical early 
warning signals (s-EWS) can indicate the proximity to 
a regime shift.
1. Temporal statistical early-warning signals (e.g., 
critical slowing down –CSD)
• Temporal s-EWS are based on the premise 
that systems recover more slowly from small 
perturbations in the vicinity of tipping points. 
Mathematically, this translates in an increase in 
autocorrelation, meaning that the system looks 
increasingly like its recent part, and an increased 
variance.
• Other statistics, which have been observed in 
a wide range of systems (e.g., global finance, 
rangelands, fish populations and epileptic 
seizures), are skewness and flickering.
2. Spatial statistical early-warning signals (e.g., 
spatial clustering)
• Spatial s-EWS include increasing spatial variance 
and skewness, which have been shown to 
provide forewarning of regime shifts in spatial 
systems.
• Other spatial indicators include the patchiness 
or cluster structure of different spatial regions as 
well as the spatial correlation between different 
regions, which are determined by specific 
characteristics of the system being investigated 
(e.g., vegetation patchiness in the case of 
desertification in arid ecosystems).
3. Signals based on power spectral density (e.g., 
increased volatility in low frequency domains)
• Power spectrum analysis separates the amount 
of variation in a time series into different 
frequencies; increasing variation at low 
frequencies relative to high frequencies is seen 
as an indication that a system is approaching or 
close to a transition.
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The use of several indicators may help improve 
environment scanning and allow an organisation to 
acquire a better understanding of the nature and 
likelihood of proximate regime shifts.
Do s-EWS provide sufficient advanced 
warning to avert undesirable regime shifts?
Critical slowing downs (CSDs) are usually used to 
determine the proximity to regime shifts in many 
instances as well as to investigate time series data 
after regime shifts. However, they are often too tardy 
to allow the action to avert a regime shift because 
large changes in the regime shift indicators often 
only occur once a regime shift is underway and 
unstoppable. In other instances, system feedbacks 
are such that lags in the system or the momentum 
of change are so great that the system is already 
committed to a regime shift.
Spatial variance can at times provide better signals 
than temporal variance. But the signal may not be 
early enough. In the case of lake eutrophication, for 
example, the process is usually already underway 
when an increase in spatial variance is observed 
(Donangelo, Fort, Dakos, Scheffer & van Nes, 2010).
How robust or reliable are s-EWS? 
Although useful in determining proximity to regime 
shifts (in the retrospective analysis), CSDs are neither 
universal nor specific to tipping points. On the one 
hand, many systems, because of the nonlinear nature 
of interactions and system variability, will not show 
typical leading indicators of regime shifts (Hastings 
& Wysham, 2010; Boerlijst, Oudman & de Roos, 
2013). On the other hand, slowing down happens 
in situations where a system becomes increasingly 
sensitive to external perturbations independently of 
whether the system is approaching a catastrophic or 
non-catastrophic change (Kéfi, Dakos, Scheffer, van 
Nes & Rietkerk, 2013). It has also been shown that 
CSD indicators can fail to detect known regime shifts, 
for example in the case of desertification where more 
context-specific indicators such as grass cover, i.e., 
spatial s-EWS, are more appropriate (Bestelmeyer, 
Duniway, James, Burkett & Havstad, 2013). Early-
warning detection by CSDs can also be sensitive to 
the choice of metric as observed by Lindegren et al. 
(2012) in the case of shifts in marine ecosystems. 
s-EWS may result in false positives and negatives. 
The impact of action and inaction in the event of false 
positives and negatives, respectively, can exacerbate 
harmful outcomes to a system. Specifically, a false 
positive may lead to policy interventions that alter 
the system dynamics precipitating a regime shift 
where none would have taken place, while a false 
negative may create an illusion of control. It is 
therefore important to characterise the error rates of 
s-EWS, e.g., through using model-based indicators 
or indicators based on an intermediate generalised 
modelling approach (Lade & Gross, 2012; Boettinger & 
Hastings, 2012) (see Section 5.3).
How to improve the usefulness of s-EWSs?
To improve detection, it may be appropriate to 
use different indicators in conjunction (Guttal & 
Jayaprakash, 2009; Lenton, 2011). More work is often 
needed to find generic combinations of indicators, 
possibly combined with system knowledge, to detect 
approaching transitions (Kéfi et al., 2013; Gsell et al., 
2016).
Recent research findings indicate that s-EWSs based 
on power spectrum can provide sufficient advanced 
warning for averting regime shifts. These indicators 
should be further explored in diverse systems, 
especially in light of emerging research on early signals 
of regime shifts in multidimensional systems where 
the interactions are described using varied network 
structures (Dakos & Bascompte, 2014; Suweis & 
D’Odorico, 2014).
5.3 Developing and using quantitative 
modelling techniques
Quantitative models of systemic risks are needed, 
since systems are driven by physical laws, and their 
behaviours can only be understood through rigorous 
modelling. Modelling outcomes are often used in the 
process of developing qualitative scenarios or are 
otherwise used to verify the consistency of qualitative 
scenarios and complement qualitative scenarios to 
inform decision-making. Modelling techniques are 
continuously being developed to understand the 
functioning of complex dynamic systems. Models 
vary in the extent to which they rely on historical data, 
capture structural relationships and processes, as 
well as their ability to assess the implications of policy 
interventions. They can be used in conjunction with 
s-EWS to determine proximity to regime shifts and the 
timing of interventions. We list below some models 
relevant to understanding specific aspects of systemic 
risks.
Semi-empirical models are physically plausible 
models of reduced complexity that exploit statistical 
relationships between the state of the system of 
interest and the driver, such as the relationship 
between sea level rise and temperature increase. 
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These models have the advantage that they can be 
parameterised to explain past relationships and can be 
designed to include fast and slow dynamics. One key 
limitation is that they may be inadequate for explaining 
future dynamics. Feedback mechanisms inherent in 
complex systems are one reason why past statistical 
relationships may no longer hold in the future. This 
limitation motivates structural or process-based 
models as in dynamic systems models. 
Dynamical systems models are models based 
on sets of structural equations that describe the 
behaviours of interacting parts in complex systems. 
Dynamic systems models have the advantage 
of being able to depict temporal dynamics and 
system structure and vice versa. They can be used 
for simulating the outcomes of alternative policy 
interventions (such as which incentive-based 
mechanism works best for ecosystem management) 
and also to highlight unintended consequences of 
policies (such as the introduction of pollution taxes 
that leads to dislocation of key industries for the local 
economy). 
Feedback loops, which are central to systemic risks, 
are often omitted from many dynamic systems models 
due to lack of knowledge (Hendricks, 2009). However, 
it is possible to overcome this “failure of omission” 
by improving our understanding of complex adaptive 
systems through experimentation and monitoring the 
occurrence of significant changes. Feedback loops 
can be added on this basis. The cause of a change 
and feedback mechanisms underlying the change 
must be established and then fed into the model. The 
dynamic act of monitoring and modelling enables 
continuous model augmentation and refinement, 
including the introduction of policy as balancing 
(negative) feedback loops. Such interventionism 
should, however, be implemented with caution to 
avoid the problem of fixing the fix (i.e., unintended 
consequences of policy intervention), which can arise 
when dealing with meta-levels of model uncertainty, 
often accompanied by data uncertainty. 
Reduced-form models developed for complex 
systems with tipping thresholds are typically generic 
models of slow-fast dynamics. They have the 
advantage of being adaptable to different scales and 
are widely used in the scientific community, because 
although they are mathematical simple, they can 
exhibit complicated dynamics (May, 1976). They have 
been proven to be useful for developing model-based 
early-warning signals in socio-ecological systems 
and epidemiology, and are also being explored in 
economic and financial systems to the same end 
(Arora, Little & McSharry, 2013; Kaufman & Scott, 
2003). 
Agent-based or multi-agent models are simulation 
models of a system populated by artificial agents, be 
they individuals, organisations, groups or biological 
species. The models capture heterogeneity by 
endowing each agent with different attributes, whether 
behavioural or physical or both. Networks within 
which agents interact adaptively to each other and 
in light of aggregate outcomes are designed. This 
process of interaction and adaptation gives rise to 
emergent behaviour. One key advantage of agent-
based modelling is that they can inform the agent 
traits and interaction patterns that yield sustainable 
system dynamics under different constraints. Agent-
based models enable us to predict impacts of policies 
where conventional modelling approaches based on 
optimising representative agents do not afford to do 
so (Farmer & Foley, 2009). 
Multi-criteria decision aiding approaches and 
methodologies aim at explicating, exploring and 
assessing decision-makers, actors and stakeholders 
view, preferences, expectations and arguments when 
dealing with complex systems and using a sound, 
valid and legitimate formal procedure to support 
expertise and decision-making. The methodology 
aims at dealing with both qualitative and quantitative 
information and weight of evidence considering 
inherent cognitive, social, cultural and procedural 
biases (Nickerson, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002). These 
approaches can be used for both participative, 
deliberative and distributed decision processes and 
risk management (Merad, Dechy & Marcel, 2014). 
Network analysis aims, in part, to identify network 
configurations that are particularly stable, where the 
network represents different features (e.g., agents, 
infrastructure, and resource) of a complex system. 
These features are represented by different nodes 
in the network and the linkages between nodes 
are characterised by specific laws of dynamics. 
The way the nodes are connected contribute to 
different network structures. Network analysis is 
particularly useful when data is limited and model 
structure uncertain. Network analysis can be used to 
identify drivers, interactions among them, and also 
the possibilities of cascading failure across a larger 
system. For instance, concerning marine regime shifts, 
Rocha et al. (2015) found that drivers related to food 
production, climate change and coastal-development 
most commonly and jointly caused regime shifts. 
Network analysis can also be used to assess 
intervention policies. When used for analysing disease 
spread, for instance, network analysis can identify 
nodes, which when disconnected, can reduce the rate 
of spreading. These network-based models can be 
enhanced based on an understanding of the functional 
connectivity between different nodes. Brockman and 
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Helbing (2013) for instance show that network analysis 
for contagion phenomena can be improved by using 
context-dependent effective distances between 
geographical nodes rather than the commonly used 
geographic distances. In the case of air-traffic-
mediated pandemic outbreaks, effective distances 
include considerations such as the origin of the new 
disease and the flow of passengers – if it is large, the 
effective distance is small and vice-versa.
It is significant that no single model in isolation can 
integrate all features of complex adaptive systems, 
such that different models often must be used in 
conjunction. One promising approach is modular 
modelling, whereby different subsystems are 
modelled separately using the most appropriate 
technique, and then integrated using specialised 
routines. Modular modelling has the advantage of 
allowing the integration of different expertise and 
facilitating collaborative modelling, where models are 
developed independently (using different assumptions 
and approaches) and outcomes crosschecked against 
each other. Moreover, the process is cyclic: specialist 
scientists check model predictions against new data 
and use new data as fresh inputs to update their 
models, thereby improving the odds of generating 
robust and up-to-date insights about systemic risk 
development and update management responses. 
Also, collaborative modelling leads to model diversity, 
making it possible to assess many different scenarios. 
To conclude, it is worth mentioning the important 
project work conducted by the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), on ‘Systemic 
Risks and Network Dynamics’. The project develops 
prognostic tools for assessing the likelihood and 
extent of cascading collapses under uncertainty and 
methods for reducing systemic risk through network 
design and control. For example, with regard to the 
resilience of national economies to natural hazards, it 
developed an agent-based model approach to assess 
indirect losses across sectors and over time in several 
dimensions (IIASA, 2018).
5.4 Scenario development 
for systemic risks
Scenario development for systemic risks is important 
both to identify the risks and to choose the appropriate 
resilience strategy (Merrie et al., 2017), but its use in 
this context is not commonplace. In addition to the 
fact that it can be a demanding process, wrongly done 
(e.g., when analysts work in silos, focus on traditional 
and linear cause and effect relationships), scenario 
development may fail to have the intended results of 
stimulating proactive governance of systemic risks. 
The main steps for scenario development have been 
outlined in the appendix to the IRGC Emerging Risk 
Guidelines report (IRGC, 2015). Herein, we highlight 
principles that are emerging to ensure that scenarios 
are effective for decision-making in the context of 
systemic risk, namely:
• Stronger connection between analyst / researcher-
driven and participatory processes 
Hard evidence—based on facts and scientific 
models—is often the first input to scenario 
development. In some cases, as with scenario 
development by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), researchers or analysts 
‘own’ the scenario development process. Their 
objective is to provide rigorous descriptions of 
how the future could play out in the form of reports 
and narratives. An alternative to researcher-driven 
scenario development is that of participatory 
development, which emphasises the engagement 
of multiple stakeholders. Participatory scenario 
development recognises the fact that effective 
identification and management of systemic risks 
requires the integration of information from diverse 
temporal and spatial scales for all relevant systems, 
i.e., social, economic, technological, political 
and environmental. Making sense of trends and 
megatrends that arise within each of these systems 
and how they may influence other systems through 
interconnection requires different expertise – experts 
in risk, experts in systems, and key decision-makers 
(OECD, 2014c). Participant-generated scenarios 
can then be quantified using simulation and the 
appropriate modelling framework. Developing 
quantitative scenarios in this way requires close 
collaboration with researchers throughout the entire 
scenario development process.
• Focusing on non-linearities and interactions 
Another important aspect of scenario development 
for systemic risks is the incorporation of non-
linear change and co-evolutionary dynamics in 
interconnected systems. And, to the extent relevant, 
incorporating megatrends in the analysis may 
additionally help develop more realistic futures 
that reveal the presence or emergence of systemic 
risks (Merrie et al., 2017); see also Section 3.3 on 
resilience assessment). When exploring the impacts 
of interlinkages or interactions between systems 
or factors, a clear distinction should be made 
between strong, weak and emerging links as these 
will determine whether the system is vulnerable 
to shifts and help to identify strategies to weaken 
specific links. Indeed, the existence of interlinkages 
is a necessary but insufficient condition to trigger 
risk cascade. On the other hand, a sub-system may 
seem to be very stable but highly vulnerable to risk 
in another sub-system to which it is tightly linked. 
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• Developing multiple narratives 
Multiple narratives are needed since they 
enable heterogeneous agents to evaluate their 
preparedness to navigate these plausible futures; 
they inform resource allocation for prevention, 
adaptation and transformation (Renn, 2017a). 
Moreover, developed in a participatory manner, 
these narratives help create a shared vision, averting 
resistance to change. In line with the imperative of 
focusing on non-linearities and interactions, it is 
important that these narratives highlight the possible 
interactions in addition to possible 'futures.' 
• Visioning and backcasting 
Participatory scenario development will uncover a 
large number of possible ways in which systemic 
risks may develop. Each stakeholder or stakeholder 
group will need to clarify how the unfolding of 
such risks can impact its organisation, and identify 
which drivers and feedback loops it may influence, 
typically, with the overarching goal of ensuring 
business continuity (Fusion, 2014). It is quite likely 
that the appropriate solutions may not come from 
any one stakeholder or sector only, especially when 
system transformation is needed. Only if such 
an understanding is shared can a collaborative 
solution that disrupts the status quo be found. 
The solution will involve defining preferable futures 
through visioning. Once the vision is shaped, it is 
possible to explore different means for achieving 
the vision, whether it is a circular economy (Bocken, 
Olivetti, Cullen, Potting & Lifset, 2017; CEPS, 
2017), a low-carbon society, sustainable fishing, 
or sustainable economic growth (Lacy & Rutqvist, 
2015; Working Group FinanCE, 2016). The visioning 
process coupled with the development of adaptive 
strategies for transformation is commonly known 
as backcasting. Fostering shared or collaborative 
sense-making throughout the entire process can 
improve the effectiveness of scenario development 
for systemic risks (McBride, Lambert, Theoharides, 
Field & Thompson, 2017).
• Iterative processes
Each phase of the systemic risk identification, 
evaluation and management process—horizon 
scanning, scenario development, visioning and 
backcasting—should be done iteratively using 
mixed methods, i.e., using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches as well as cycling between 
exploratory and normative perspectives (Star 
et al., 2016). The iterative process also applies 
to a continuous system monitoring that allows 
assumptions and scenarios to be verified and 
updated.
For illustration purposes, this section includes some examples of: 
• Fostering sustainability transitions to reduce globally distributed environmental 
systemic risks (Section 6)
• How to integrate systemic risks and local context in climate-change adaptation: the 
economics of climate adaptation (ECA) (Section 7)
Further, the OECD approach to public sector innovation provides some illustration of 
how systems thinking can be used by governments to foster transitions (Section 8)
 
GENERIC ILLUSTRATIVE 
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6. FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY 
TRANSITIONS TO REDUCE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMIC RISKS
This section is based on a written contribution made by 
Mike Asquith and Vincent Viaud, European Environment 
Agency. It describes on-going research developments 
in Europe around sustainability transitions and their 
implications for governance.
6.1 The rise of systemic environmental risks 
Many of today’s environmental challenges, such 
as climate change, biodiversity loss, ecosystem 
degradation and combined exposure to chemicals, are 
characterised by complexity. They have multiple causes 
and feature many interdependencies and feedbacks 
between their underlying drivers and associated 
impacts across time and spatial scales. They are also 
‘wicked problems’ that are difficult to delineate, define 
clearly or agree on, as they pervade differing parts 
of the environment and society and are perceived in 
diverse ways by stakeholders (Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). 
Overall, such environmental challenges are resistant to 
policy response (National Research Council, 2014; EEA, 
2018). This contrasts with more specific environmental 
issues, such as water quality and nutrient loading, 
urban wastewater, and waste management, which 
have been addressed successfully in Europe and 
elsewhere during recent decades. New approaches and 
perspectives are therefore needed to address these 
systemic challenges and identify associated risks (EEA, 
2015a). 
Adopting a more systemic, global and long-term 
perspective highlights fundamental concerns about 
the impact of global consumption and production on 
the natural systems that ultimately sustain human 
development. The world has witnessed unprecedented 
demographic and economic growth during the last 
two centuries, accompanied by massive urbanisation, 
globalisation of markets, accelerating technological 
development, and fundamental socio-economic and 
cultural transformations. These large-scale, long-
term and high impact changes — often referred to 
as ‘global megatrends’ (EEA, 2015b) — have led to 
substantial economic and human development, but 
have also resulted in excessive burdens on the global 
ecosystem, resource demands and adverse pressures 
on local ecosystems. The ‘great acceleration’ in human 
socio-economic activity worldwide and its associated 
environmental impacts have been so great that 
scientists say that we have entered a new geological 
era, ‘the Anthropocene.’ In such an environment, 
humans have become the most influential factor 
impacting the Earth system (Steffen et al., 2015a).
If these global megatrends persist in coming decades, 
with the growing global middle class continuing 
to adopt resource-intensive Western lifestyles, 
it is relevant to ask about the limits of tolerable 
environmental pressure on the Earth’s life support 
systems (UNEP, 2016; U.N., 2015). Scientists say that 
human pressures on the Earth system have reached 
a scale that risks precipitating catastrophic global 
changes (U.N., 2010). 
Global environmental change researchers have 
identified nine critical processes that regulate the 
stability and resilience of the Earth system (Rockström 
et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015b). They argue that 
sustainable development is only achieved within a 
safe operating space for humanity identified by the 
biophysical realities of critical natural thresholds. 
Transgressing these ‘planetary boundaries’ could 
lead to undesirable and irreversible changes in the 
environment, putting at risk ecosystem and societal 
resilience, and making the Earth a much less hospitable 
place. Despite the uncertainty, there is evidence that 
both planetary and regional boundaries for some areas 
have already been transgressed, and systemic risks 
to human societies have materialised or will soon 
materialise. These include effects on human health, 
agricultural production, energy and transport, and 
tourism from the projected increased frequency of 
extreme climate-related events in Europe (EEA, 2017) 
and elsewhere. 
Today, environmental governance increasingly focuses 
on understanding how societies can transform their 
systems of production and consumption in ways that 
avoid human-induced global systemic risks and ensure 
sustainable development for all, including social and 
business development (Centeno et al., 2015; Nauser, 
2015; Yosie, 2017).
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6.2 Governance for sustainability 
transitions
Sustainability science increasingly emphasises that 
global environmental systemic risks necessitate 
transitions or transformations – ‘long-term, multi-
dimensional processes of change [based on] profound 
changes in dominant practices, policies and thinking’ 
(EEA, 2015b). To some extent, this trend reflects 
insights from ecology and complex systems theory, 
which maintain that the resilience of systems at the 
macro scale depends in part on transformability 
at smaller scales (Folke et al., 2010). Accordingly, 
preserving the stability and functioning of the global 
ecosystem requires that societies find ways to 
transform the production-consumption systems that 
drive environmental degradation (Helbing, 2013). 
Socio-technical transitions research addresses 
precisely this issue, seeking to explain the 
characteristics and dynamics of the systems that meet 
core societal needs, such as energy, mobility, food and 
shelter. Such systems are understood to be complex 
and multi-functional, linking to diverse interests across 
society, including investments, jobs, skills, rules, habits 
and values. The interdependence of these elements 
means that there are often strong economic, social and 
political lock-ins to the dominant system, which prevent 
the emergence of new technologies and practices that 
could catalyse transformation. As a result, change in 
these systems normally takes the form of incremental 
efficiency improvements, rather than the radical 
reconfiguration needed to achieve sustainability 
(Helbing, 2012). 
Within socio-technical transitions research, the ‘multi-
level perspective’ (see Figure 6) is a popular framework 
for understanding systemic change (Geels, 2002). 
According to this perspective, the transformation of 
the established system or ‘regime’ requires two things. 
The first is ‘niches’ — protected spaces below the 
regime level where new technologies or practices can 
develop without direct exposure to the normal market 
or social and institutional pressures (Raven et al., 
2010). These spaces include innovation labs within 
large companies or publicly funded research initiatives. 
In addition to niches, the study of past transitions 
indicates that they depend on forces that can 
disrupt the established regime, creating windows of 
opportunity for innovations to establish themselves. 
Such forces come from the exogenous 'landscape' 
level and include slowly evolving megatrends such 
as demographic change and associated demand for 
resources, as well as more sudden shocks such as a 
nuclear disaster (Raven et al., 2010).
From a governance perspective, these insights 
into the dynamics of systemic change have some 
significant implications. They suggest, for example, 
that governments can contribute to transitions by 
creating niches and supporting upscaling using tools 
such as innovation and industrial policy. Similarly, they 
can facilitate reconfiguration of the dominant regime 
by putting pressure on incumbents (e.g., via regulation 
or fiscal policy) and helping compensate losers (e.g., 
via welfare policy or retraining) (Geels, 2016; Merad, 
Dechy & Marcel, 2014).
It is evident, however, that governments cannot simply 
plan and control transition processes. Systemic 
change engages diverse actors across society and 
involves the co-evolution of a considerable number 
of different social, technical, institutional and cultural 
elements. Transitions are therefore highly complex 
and uncertain processes, leading to unpredictable 
outcomes and creating new types of risks even as 
they respond to systemic environmental problems. The 
society-wide character of transitions implies that part 
of the state’s role is to create enabling frameworks 
for more distributed, emergent forms of governance 
via markets and networks, and to help steer these 
processes by engaging social actors in articulating 
shared visions and goals. Governments can also help 
to mitigate and respond to the emerging risks inherent 
in technological and social change, for example by 
using horizon scanning methods, the precautionary 
principle, and iterative, adaptive processes of 
experimenting and learning.
Figure 6: The multi-level perspective on sustainability 
transitions (adapted from Sustainability transitions: Now for 
the long term by EEA, 2016).
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The author of this section is David N. Bresch, ETH 
Zurich / MeteoSwiss.
This section describes and illustrates the Economics 
of Climate Adaptation (ECA) methodology (Bresch, 
2017) for dealing with the complex and interconnected 
system around the economy of climate change 
adaptation. The approach is part of new evolutionary 
concepts of systems dynamics, which allow one 
to identify and review the behaviour of complex 
systems over time using feedback loops and other 
relevant information. Applying the logic of systems 
dynamics, ECA establishes an economic framework to 
integrate risk and reward perspectives. Starting from 
a comprehensive mapping of hazards and exposed 
assets, using state-of-the-art probabilistic risk 
modelling techniques, it integrates different economic 
development and climate impact scenarios to assess 
risk and combines them with a cost-benefit approach 
to prioritise a comprehensive portfolio of measures 
to address risk. The method fully acknowledges the 
complexity and uncertainty of weather and climate-
related risks. It makes the case that an economic 
approach to climate change makes economic sense in 
local settings.
7.1. Incorporating weather vulnerability 
assessment into weather and climate 
resilience plans: the Economics 
of Climate Adaptation (ECA) 
Improving the resilience of our societies in the face 
of volatile weather and climate change is an urgent 
priority today and will increase in importance in the 
decades to come. The climate of the past is by no 
means a sufficient basis for future decisions. Never 
in history has society known so much about the 
processes that shape its future and obtained a wealth 
of forward-looking weather and climate information – 
yet pre-emptive (and precautionary) action is not as 
widespread as is it could be. While measures exist 
to adapt to an ever-changing environment, decision 
makers on all levels – from multinational organisations 
(such as the Green Climate Fund, GCF, cf. Bresch 
et al., 2017), sovereigns, sub-sovereigns, cities and 
7. INTEGRATING LOCAL CONTEXT  
AND SYSTEMS THINKING:  
AN ILLUSTRATION
companies down to the local community – need the 
facts to identify the most cost-effective instruments. 
They need to know the potential weather and climate-
related damages over the coming decades in order 
to identify measures to mitigate these risks – and to 
decide whether the benefits will outweigh the costs.
The Economics of Climate Adaptation (ECA) 
methodology – developed by the ECA Group since 
2009 (ECA Group, 2009; Bresch, 2014; Bresch, 
2016) – provides decision-makers with a fact base 
to answer these questions systematically. It enables 
them to understand and quantify the impact of 
weather and climate change and to identify actions 
to minimise that impact at the lowest cost. The 
application of a worldwide, consistent, yet locally 
specific methodology to strengthen climate resilience, 
therefore, allows integrating adaptation with economic 
development and sustainable growth. 
The ECA methodology establishes an economic 
framework to fully integrate risk and reward 
perspectives of different stakeholders (Souvignet, 
Wieneke, Müller & Bresch, 2016). Starting from a 
comprehensive mapping of hazards and exposed 
assets, using state-of-the-art probabilistic risk 
modelling techniques (Monte Carlo simulations 
building on ensembles and weather generators), 
it integrates different economic development and 
climate impact scenarios combined with a cost-
benefit approach (discounting capital and operational 
expenditures over time, compared to discounted 
averted damages) to assess a comprehensive portfolio 
of adaptation measures (Bresch, 2017).
Adaptation measures include, for example, building 
defences, improved spatial planning, ecosystem-
based approaches, building regulations and risk 
transfer (insurance) against some of the more extreme 
weather events (RSA-WWF, 2014). Case studies in 
more than 20 different regions around the globe, 
ranging from Maharashtra in India to the US Gulf 
Coast, covering most key hazards (storm, surge, 
flood, drought) and a wide range of economic and 
even informal sectors, involving many hundreds 
of stakeholders in total, showed that a significant 
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portion (up to 65%) of expected damage from climate 
change can be averted using cost-effective adaptation 
measures – a strong case for preventive action. Since 
many regions especially sensitive to natural hazards 
occasionally lack precise and long historical records 
of pertinent data, the ECA methodology provides a 
tool to overcome many of these limitations by making 
extensive use of probabilistic risk assessment and 
scenario techniques. This holistic approach avoids 
issues such as maladaptation due to too narrow a 
focus on incremental risk, and it explicitly deals with 
uncertainty by applying probabilistic modelling to 
cover the whole range of possible events, outcomes 
and climate impact scenarios to account for 
different, equally plausible consistent future states 
of the whole system of interest (while considering 
system boundaries). Such an approach accounts for 
concomitant changes in several climate variables and 
allows one to deal with their interactions.
In the ECA context, economics is understood as 
the art of resource allocation, using the concept 
of risk (and reward) as a means to incentivise the 
internalisation of known externalities – or, simply put, 
to make the most and best use of existing knowledge 
of any pertinent system in order to improve its long-
term performance and balance stakeholders’ needs 
and perspectives today and tomorrow. The goals of 
achieving economic growth and reducing climate risk 
are by no means in conflict. We do not have to choose 
between them. In fact, sustained growth cannot be 
achieved unless we address the risks associated 
with climate change. To realise growth opportunities, 
governments and businesses must therefore actively 
manage weather, climate and other environmental 
risks and incorporate them into their economic and 
development strategies, as well as in their investment 
decisions. 
So far, ECA studies have been carried out for:
• The City of New York (a focus on urban 
infrastructure resilience such as storm surge), 
• The City of Hull, UK (a focus on risk from multiple 
hazards such as wind, inland flood, storm surge), 
• The City of Miami and the region of South Florida, 
USA (a focus on risk from hurricanes), 
• The North and North East China and Maharashtra, 
India regions (a focus on drought risk to agriculture), 
• Mopti region, Mali (a focus on risk to agriculture 
from climate zone shift), 
• Georgetown, Guyana (a focus on risk from flash 
floods),
• Samoa (a focus on risks caused by sea level rise 
such as storm surge and groundwater salination),
• Tanzania (a focus on health and power risks caused 
by drought),
• The Caribbean (several multi-hazard and sector 
studies in Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman 
Islands, Bermuda, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, 
and Dominica),
• Energy sector study along the US Gulf Coast 
(Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas),
• Flood risk in an urban context in Barisal, 
Bangladesh.
• Landslides in San Salvador, El Salvador.
7.2 Illustration: the case of Samoa 
Samoa is a group of islands in the South Pacific 
Ocean. Sea level rise represents a very significant 
systemic risk.
Assessing the risk
Total climate risk comprises today’s risk and the future 
risk associated with economic growth and climate 
change. Making use of high-resolution exposure 
information fed into probabilistic risk assessment 
models for storm surge risk, the study analysed the 
risk of sea level rise to Samoa today (yellow, USD 
25 million) and by 2030 (red, USD 77 million). Both 
economic development (USD 22 million, orange) 
and climate change (USD 30 million, high impact 
scenario, bright red) are key drivers of risk by 2030. 
Samoa faces a substantial increase of risk in less than 
two decades, resulting in a total climate risk of USD 
77 billion. The green arrow indicates the portion of 
risk that can be cost-efficiently averted, based on a 
rigorous analysis of a basket of adaptation measures, 
as explained in the next step.
Figure 7: ECA Samoa – Risk of sea level rise to small 
island state
25
+22
+30
−44%
77
Samoa. Risk of sea level rise to a small island state (mn USD)  
Risk today (annual expected loss)
Additional risk due to 
economic development 
Additional risk due 
to climate change 
Total climate risk: 
Future risk in 2030
Residual risk remains as not all 
losses are avoidable, such as low 
frequency-high severity events  
Climate adaptation: 
Risk reduction potential through 
cost-eective adaptation measures 
(prevention and mitigation)   
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Addressing the risk
A comprehensive set of possible adaptation measures 
has been identified in dialogue with local stakeholders 
and based on further consultations. Such measures 
include, for example, building defences (dikes and 
seawalls), improved spatial planning (including the 
relocation of buildings), ecosystem-based approaches 
(e.g., reefs, mangroves), building regulations 
(e.g., floodproofing), behavioral initiatives such as 
awareness campaigns, and emergency planning and 
response measures (e.g., sandbags, mobile barriers). 
Using probabilistic risk assessment models, the 
damage aversion potential (horizontal axis) of each 
adaptation measure has been analysed (rectangle, 
green/orange), as well as its benefit/cost ratio (vertical 
axis). Note that for this particular case, about 40% of 
the damage under even a high climate change impact 
scenario can be cost-efficiently averted. But there 
remains a residual potential loss, which is addressed 
in the next step.
reducing 49% of residual risk) and bear a much higher 
cost (USD 23 million compared to only USD 7 million 
for risk transfer). 
Figure 8: ECA Samoa – Reduced damage per USD 
invested
Figure 9: ECA Samoa – 250-Year storm impact
Covering residual risk
Consider a 250-year storm surge event, which will 
result in damage of more than 30% of local GDP. Even 
with cost-efficient adaptation in place (green arrow, 
summarising the effect of the measures described 
above) and budget tolerance (an assumed maximum 
bearable loss of 5% of GDP), there remains a 
significant residual risk to be covered (orange arrow). 
Risk transfer provides additional protection for low 
frequency, high severity events at a lower cost than 
further non-cost-efficient measures (orange arrow 
and bar). Note that the cost for risk transfer is lowered 
by the fact that cost-efficient adaptation measures 
reduce a substantial amount of risk (green arrow, here 
measured regarding GDP). Further non-cost-efficient 
measures (grey) would be both less effective (only 
Risk prevention and risk transfer are mutually 
reinforcing. While insurance is a useful component in a 
given adaptation portfolio, keeping prices in check by 
minimising residual risks through prevention measures 
is key.
This case study illustrates the importance of a sound 
methodology to allow for integration of a broad set 
of stakeholder views and perspectives, not least 
expressed in their suggestions for possible adaptation 
measures. The ECA methodology establishes an 
economic framework for integrating risk and reward 
perspectives of different stakeholders. To strengthen 
resilience, the end-user or demand-side perspective 
matters. Therefore, the team that delivered the above 
case study did engage with end-users to seek a 
shared understanding of their vulnerability, or, more 
specifically, their climate sensitivity. In the present 
case, the study informed stakeholders about the fact 
that much more can be done to manage weather and 
climate risk, as it helped to correct the widespread 
belief that not much could be done against a 250-year 
storm surge event. 
The study makes the strong point that, to realise 
growth opportunities, both the public and the private 
sector must actively manage the weather, climate, and 
other systemic environmental risks and incorporate 
them in development strategies, as well as in 
investment decisions, with the aim to foster societal 
resilience against these risks (Yosie, 2015).
Total climate risk
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In 2017 the OECD Observatory of Public Sector 
Innovation (an initiative of the OECD's Public 
Governance and Territorial Development Directorate) 
published considerations and suggestions about how 
the public sector could adopt a systems approach to 
address ‘wicked’ problems (OECD, 2017). 
Systems thinking in the public sector is not widely 
used. Traditionally, public policy makers address 
problems through discrete interventions that are 
layered on top of each other, with the risk that such 
interventions may shift problems from one part of the 
system to another or address symptoms while ignoring 
causes. Faced with complexity and uncertainty that 
underlie complex systems, traditional analytical tools 
and problem-solving methods are largely ineffective 
and can even have perverse consequences. 
The OECD report is based on case studies and 
applies the generic approaches outlined in previous 
sections on systems thinking, systems dynamics, 
complexity theory, and organisational resilience to 
address problems of systemic risks. It examines how 
the systemic change was triggered and managed by 
public sector interventions in the areas of preventing 
domestic violence (Iceland), protecting children 
(the Netherlands), regulating the sharing economy 
(Canada) and designing a policy to set a framework for 
conducting experiments in government (Finland). 
Integrated interventions, stakeholder engagement, 
reverse process engineering and the role of 
"independent brokers" outside of government are 
techniques that the report analyses for stimulating 
progress towards more systems thinking in 
government in order to better address systemic risks. 
Success factors include: 
• Moving away from traditional linear procedures, 
strategic planning and the notion of reform as an 
isolated intervention.
• Building capacity to elaborate future scenarios, 
based on a vision for a desired future outcome.
• Defining the principles according to which the 
desirable future system should operate.
8. SYSTEMS THINKING  
FOR INNOVATION  
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
• Designing a set of interventions to start the change 
from the existing system to the future system 
(transformation process).
• Ensuring that leadership can mobilise a broad range 
of actors that will form a critical mass willing to act, 
to focus on achieving a common good rather than 
on narrow institutional interests.
• Meaningful measurements and feedback 
mechanisms for constant adjustment throughout the 
policy cycle, so that the usual gap between policy 
design and implementation is reduced.
• Proper timing of change: people need time to live 
through, experience and appropriate change.
Systems approaches can help navigate difficult 
transitions from unsustainable systems to more 
desirable systems by allowing new practices to be 
rolled out while core processes are still running. These 
approaches are relevant both to stimulate innovation 
and to foster systemic resilience. But more work 
is needed to understand how to embed systems 
approaches in public policy.
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GLOSSARY
Adaptation: the action or process of adapting or being 
adapted to something. It involves adjusting responses 
to changing external drivers and internal processes 
in order to remain in the desired regime and on the 
current pathway. Adaptation is achieved through 
incremental change. It is seen as a slow process, 
which modifies the landscape only slightly.
Agent-based modelling: a class of computational 
models for simulating the actions and interactions 
of autonomous agents to assess their effects on the 
system as a whole.
Ambiguity: divergent or contested perspectives on 
the justification, severity or wider meanings associated 
with a given threat.
Boundary: the periphery of a system, including non-
core sub-systems.
Cascading effects: multiple self-reinforcing feedback 
mechanisms whereby a shock to one system triggers 
consequences in various connected subsystems.
Complex adaptive system: systems of distributed 
interacting components, whose conditions can change 
in response to their environments and to each other.
Complexity: difficulties in identifying and quantifying 
causal links between a multitude of potential causal 
agents and specific observed effects.
Critical slowing down: the theory that in cases 
where a system is close to a critical tipping point the 
recovery rate should decrease.
Data analytics: the process of inspecting, cleansing, 
transforming, and modelling data with the goal of 
discovering useful information.
Early-warning signals: markers, either data-based 
or context-based that indicate a possible impending 
transition towards an unfavourable state.
Efficiency: the capacity of a system to perform 
intended functions in optimal time and with a minimal 
resource cost.
Emerging risks new risks or known risks that 
become apparent in new conditions (IRGC 2015).
Feedback loop: when outputs of a system are routed 
back as inputs as part of a chain of cause-and-effect 
that forms a circuit or loop.
Horizon scanning: an organised formal process of 
gathering, analysing and disseminating value-added 
information to support decision- making.
Learning and experimentation: the capacity of a 
system to test the effects of system change under 
controlled settings, and identify policies or goals to 
achieve positive change.
Lock-in: an arrangement where a system is 
increasingly obliged to operate under a certain series 
of principles, resources, or realities that makes it less 
nimble to transition in the face of adversity.
Niches: denoting or relating to products, services, or 
interests that appeal to a small, specialised section of 
the population.
Regime: the prevailing contextual environment and 
structure of systems that determines the normal 
expected behaviour of such systems.
Regime shift: large, abrupt, persistent changes in the 
structure and function of a system.
Resilience: the ability of a system to plan, prepare for, 
absorb, recover from, and adapt in the aftermath of 
systemic threats.
Risk governance: the totality of actors, rules, 
conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned 
with how relevant risk information is collected, 
analysed and communicated and management 
decisions are taken.
Risk management: the design and implementation of 
the actions and remedies required to avoid, reduce, 
transfer or retain the risks.
Scenarios: plausible storylines, developed by 
organisations, about how the future might unfold 
and how this might affect an issue that confronts 
them or challenge their status as an ongoing 
concern. Scenarios can be developed qualitatively, 
quantitatively, or both.
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Self-organisation: a process where some form of 
overall order arises from local interactions between 
parts of an initially disordered system. These systems 
arise organically, as opposed to via structured 
interventions by decision makers.
Slow-developing catastrophic risks: risks that 
develop slowly, but which can ultimately lead to 
sudden, catastrophic and often irreversible changes in 
complex social, economic and ecological systems.
Socio-ecological systems: a system that is defined 
at several spatial, temporal, and organisational scales, 
which may be hierarchically linked.
Socio-technical systems: the interaction between 
society's complex infrastructures and human 
behaviour.
System: a regularly interacting or interdependent 
group of items forming a unified whole.
Systemic risks: the threat that individual failures, 
accidents, or disruptions present to a system through 
the process of contagion.
Systems thinking: adopting a perspective where 
all objects, organisations, and activities in daily life 
operate within a given system and are comprised of 
smaller sub-systems.
Tipping point: a point in time where a system is 
vulnerable to transition into a new form.
Transformation: is a thorough or dramatic change 
in form or appearance. It involves fundamentally 
changing the system dynamics, so there are new 
feedbacks to maintain the system in a new regime or 
along a new pathway. It is a change towards a future 
that is fundamentally different from what currently 
exists.
Transition: long-term, multi-dimensional and 
fundamental processes of change, based on profound 
changes in dominant practices, policies and thinking 
(EEA).
Uncertainty: a lack of clarity or quality of the scientific 
or technical data.
Wicked problems: a problem that is difficult 
or impossible to solve because of incomplete, 
contradictory, and changing requirements that are 
often difficult to recognise.
Windows of opportunity: periods where systemic 
transition into a more favourable state is eased due to 
an amenable resource and/or contextual environment.
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